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Abstract
Background:  Surgical interventions are high-risk healthcare services. Increasing awareness over the
past years has led to efforts to enhance patient safety. Patients do not represent the only category that
must be considered when analyzing adverse events since physicians are also affected. Hence, measures
aiming at improving patient safety will inevitably affect both patients and physicians. 
Aim: The current thesis is aiming at assessing the effects of patient safety measures on job satisfaction
of operating room personnel working in an Italian hospital. 
Methods:  Data was collected in mid-March 2014 through 12 semi-structured interviews conducted
during two visits to the operating room. Four surgeons, four anesthetists, and four anesthetist nurses
were selected randomly on a voluntary basis among clinicians at work. The questionnaire items fell
into  the  following  categories:  patient  care,  work  burden,  professional  relationships,  and  general
satisfaction. Thematic data analysis was performed with an inductive approach. 
Results: Respondents from the three professionals profiles described the Surgical Patient Path to be an
efficient patient safety measure. For what concerns their level of job satisfaction, although perceptions
varied considerably, most respondents reported positive effects. Data showed that (1) positive effects
were emphasized at the highest degree among surgeons in virtue of the perceived progresses in terms of
safety both for the patient and for them, (2) anesthetist nurses were facing several problems during the
data  collection process,  (3)  perceptions differed among those that  had a  deeper knowledge on the
program due to their managerial position or involvement in the its development and those that had less,
and finally (4) participants were lacking information on results of the Surgical Patient Path.   
Conclusion:  According  to  the  findings,  communication  should  be  addressed  in  order  to  avoid
dissatisfaction. Clinicians must be given the tools needed to have a clear understanding of the results
that have been achieved with the Surgical Patient Path. This is fundamental for the purpose of ensuring
high  levels  of  motivation  to  perform  tasks  diligently,  harmonize  perceptions  and  increase  job
satisfaction of anesthetist nurses.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization has suggested that in industrialized countries up to one in ten patients is
affected by medical errors and in developing countries the risk is much higher. Surgical interventions
represent  a  particularly  challenging  healthcare  service  and  in  industrialized  countries  alone  they
represented half of the medical errors accountable for disabilities and deaths (WHO, '10 facts on patient
safety'). In the European Union, 18% of citizens claimed to have been victims of a serious case of
medical errors in hospital settings and the World Health Organization sustained that, based on empirical
studies, between 50% and 70% of medical errors could be avoided by implementing comprehensive
measures for patient safety. Patient safety refers to the provision of healthcare services without medical
errors,  thus  without  harming the  patient.  By addressing patient  safety effectively  in  the  European
Union, 750.000 adverse events could be prevented each year, thereby reducing days of hospitalization
by 3.2 million, the number of cases of disability by 260.000, and deaths by 95.000  (WHO 'Patient
Safety').  Adverse  events  are  defined as  unintended and undesirable  incidents  occurring  during  the
healthcare process and that provoke harm to patients. Adverse events that are due to medical errors can
be prevented (MLHSP 2009). 
Other high risk industries such as nuclear power and aviation have achieved significant progresses in
increasing safety inducing the World Health Organization and others to argue that healthcare, too, can
reduce the incidence of medical  errors by addressing the problem with a comprehensive approach.
Albeit several risks, in aviation there is one in 1.000.000 risk of an aircraft passenger being harmed
while traveling compared to one in 300 risk for a patient being harmed while receiving healthcare
services. As other high risk industries have proved that safety can be drastically  improved and by
considering the fact that healthcare services have not just became more effective but also more complex
and challenging in the face of new medicines and technologies developed for treating older and sicker
patients, in 2002 the World Health Organization and its member states recognized medical errors as a
global healthcare issue by adopting the World Health Assembly resolution on patient safety (WHO, '10
facts on patient safety'; WHO, 'Patient Safety').
The Italian Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Policies (MLHSP) has defined safety in the operating
room to be fundamental for patient safety. The factors that make the operating room such a high risk
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environment, even when interventions are not particularly complex, are the number of professionals
involved, the amount of information required, the technological component, the patients' conditions,
the fast-paced rhythm, and the various critical points during surgery when harm to patients can be
caused. Limiting the impact of these factors is highly dependent on effective communication flows
needed to establish a climate of collaboration among professionals. For this purpose, the Ministry of
Labour, Health and Social Policies developed in 2009 a list of 16 objectives that must be pursued in
each operating room in order to ensure patient safety. The first objective consisted of eliminating cases
of wrong-site and wrong-patient procedures, whereas promoting communication was objective number
12 (MLHSP 2009). In its attempt of addressing culture resistance and to facilitate change of clinical
practice in order to improve safety of surgical patients,  the Ministry of Labour,  Health and Social
Policies has chosen the Directorate General of Health of Lombardy Region as one of its partners. The
Lombardy Region is famous for its excellence in healthcare yet the close monitoring of medical errors
proved the  region was  not  immune  to  this  problem.  Between 1999 and  2007,  29.700 cases  were
detected and more than one third occurred in the operating room. The overall increase in healthcare
spending was euro 87 millions and euro 25 millions were due to surgical errors (Ravizza 2007).
When analyzing adverse events patients do not represent the only category that must be considered
because physicians are also affected. Literature suggested that as physicians feel they are expected to
provide  error-free  healthcare,  being  involved  in  a  medical  error  has  a  significant  impact  on  them
(Waterman et al 2007). Measures aiming at increasing patient safety will inevitably affect both patients
and physicians. The current thesis is aiming at assessing the job satisfaction of the operating room
personnel working at Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital in Forli' (Italy) in the post-introduction period of
the Operating Room Management System. The implementation of the system started in 2006 with the
aim of increasing patient safety. The results achieved have went beyond the initial objective allowing
Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital to increase efficiency in the use of operating room resource.   
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 2. HEALTHCARE IN ITALY
2.1. Development of the Italian healthcare system
Italy became the republic it is today after the constitutional referendum which took place in June 1946
to reveal people's preferences on whether the head of state should be democratically chosen or come
from a family dynasty as it had been done so far.
In  the  entire  post-war  period  until  1978  Italy  had  organized  its  healthcare  system  following  the
Bismarck model. Healthcare insurance was provided on work basis by sickness funds, called  casse
mutue,  that were quasi-governmental institutions. Their financial performance was unsatisfactory and
they were heavily relying on the financial support of the government. The coverage was not universal
and the benefit package varied considerably across sickness funds and also across regions, as benefit
packages offered in Northern Italy were more generous than in Southern Italy (Ministero della Sanita'
1975).  Additionally, two other factors contributed to the health reform from 1978 that introduced the
Beveridge  model  characterized  by  universal  coverage  and  funded  through  taxes  collected  by  the
government: (1) the political power achieved by the Left political movement during the previous years,
and (2) the decentralization of governmental power by giving the regions political autonomy through
the 1948 constitution (France and Taroni 2005).
In December 1978 the Law 833/1978 introduced a drastic change in the Italian healthcare system with
the constitution of the National Health Service which went into operation in 1980. The main purpose of
the new system was to ensure universal coverage to all citizens and access across the country to the
benefit package defined by the state abolishing this way geographical disparities (Donatini et al 2001).
The financial aspect of the health system was also changed as the sickness funds did no longer exist.
Collecting the necessary funds from taxes was now responsibility of the government. In other words,
the financial source of the health system changed from payrolls to taxes and the body in charge of
collecting  and  administrating  the  funds  changed,  too,  since  sickness  funds  were  abolished.  The
underlying cause of change was the government's objective of controlling the growth of the health
expenditure, and for this reason planning and budgeting were duties of the central authorities, whereas
provision and control were duties of the local authorities (France and Taroni 2005). However, the roles
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of the three different levels, central-regional-local, were still not clearly defined. The previous sickness
funds were now replaced by local health authorities similar to the district health authorities from the
National Health System of the United Kingdom with the difference that the local health authorities
were  governed  by  democratically  elected  authorities  introducing  this  way  the  principle  of  public
democratic control (Donatini et al 2001).
The second big reform was introduced through two Legislative Decrees, 502/1992 and 517/1993, that
attempted to increase microeconomic efficiency given the low financial performance of the previous
years and macroeconomic stabilization considering the financial crisis Italy was facing in that period.
The former objective was to be achieved by introducing competition and managerialism in the health
market  through  new  mechanisms  such  as  fees  for  service,  diagnostic  related  groups  and  by
transforming local health  authorities  and hospitals  into public  enterprises increasing this  way their
sensitivity to competition with private providers (Lozzi 2008). 
The results  achieved in  quality  of  care  were  not  satisfactory enough and thus  a  third  reform was
implemented  in  1999  by  passing  Legislative  Decree  229/1999.  The  new  reform  was  aiming  at
reinforcing the objective of the 1978 reform, that is equal access across regions to the same benefit
package. Additionally, it was aiming at promoting collaboration between bodies, giving greater power
to  physicians  for  what  concerned clinical  governance  and finally  strengthening autonomy of  local
authorities (France and Taroni 2005). The  Legislative Decree 229/1999 was the central piece of a
series of restructuring measures that defined the current organization of the Italian health system in
which the central government allocates public funds to the 20 regions allowing them to freely allocate
the funds to hospital within their territories according to reimbursement rates and quality standards that
are defined at regional level (Hall 2012).
The  most  recent  reforms were  made  aiming  at  reducing  healthcare  costs,  in  consideration  of  the
austerity  the  Italian  economy  has  been  facing  in  recent  years.  In  consequence,  according  to  the
European  Health  Commission the  Italian  public  expenditure,  7% of  GDP,  was slightly  below EU
average,  8% of  GDP as  Paterlini  (2013) suggested.  The latest  measure  that  led to  this  result  was
Balduzzi's  decree  implemented  during  the  former  Mario  Monti  government,  with  the  objective  to
increase quality of care while at the same time increasing cost-effectiveness of the system by acting at
mechanisms operating at  regional level.  The measures provided concerned a more effective use of
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drugs, ensuring permanent access to health services with teams of general practitioners, updating prices
of services provided and finally two innovative measures, introduction of health technology assessment
and reorganization of the governance of hospitals and local health units (Thomson et al 2013).
In 1992 the decentralization of the healthcare system into three levels central, regional and local began.
The central body, the Ministry of Health, which defines the basic benefit package, livelli essenziali di
assistenza,  is  in  charge  of  making  sure  the  system  is  working  according  to  the  following  three
principles (1) equal access, (2) universal coverage, and (3) solidarity, and it makes sure that european
regulations are being followed (Greco 2013, Donatini et al 2001). The Ministry of Health is also in
charge of suggesting the 20 regions how funds should be allocated starting from the necessities of the
population revealed in the yearly national health status. The regions have the final say in the allocation
process within their territory, and they are also responsible for integrating the funds from the central
government with regional taxes. The regions have been given legislative power, executive power and
also power of evaluation in order to achieve national goals trough regional plans. For this purpose, the
regional  health  department  issues  guidelines,  allocates  funds,  nominates  CEOs  of  local  health
authorities  and assesses their  performance (Ibid).  The local  health  authorities  are  in  charge  of  the
delivery of public health services, occupational and social healthcare, hospital care and primary care
within their territory (The Commonwealth Fund 2012).
The national health system gave for a short period, 1992-1993, an opt-out opportunity and despite its
abolition the rate of private health insurance has increased considerably from around 5-10%  the mid
1990s to around 35% according to recent estimates, reflecting dissatisfaction due to long waiting lists,
high co-payments and not always satisfactory quality of service (Donatini 2001, Paterlini 2013).
2.2. Italian hospitals
Financial  resources  utilized  by  hospital  have  always  represented  a  relevant  driver  of  healthcare
expenditure, and 46% of the aggregated healthcare expenditure was attributable to hospital costs in
2008  (European  Hospital  and  Healthcare  Federation  2011).  In  the  attempt  of  improving  cost
containment, starting from 1994 major hospitals were given the status of independent trusts and unlike
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the rest of hospitals that are strongly financially dependent on local health units, the former received
financial autonomy. Moreover, they received technical autonomy as well and such autonomies were
also given to the local health authorities when it was decided they should enjoy greater flexibility when
avoiding higher costs (Donatini 2001).
Hospitals in Italy can be either public or private. The latter can be divided in two subcategories: (1)
private hospitals with private funds or (2) private hospitals with private funds as well as governmental
funds if accredited to work for the national health system (Greco 2013). Starting two years before they
received financial  and technical  autonomy,  that  is  1992,  until  2004 public  hospitals  reduced their
number  from 1.832  to  1.214,  whereas  private  hospitals  increased  their  number  although  they  are
generally smaller than the public ones (Lozzi 2008). A 6,2% reduction of hospitalizations was observed
in the period 1993-2003 from 8,8 millions to 8,25 millions, and hospital days were also reduced from
11 to 7,5 between 1994 and 2003 (Lozzi 2008). Cost containment through reduced capacity was also
shown in the reduction of beds per 1.000 inhabitants in acute care, private and public hospital going
from 6,7 beds in 1992 to 4,6 beds in 2004 (Ibid). However, according to Lozzi (2008) the variation was
more significant in public hospitals than in private accredited hospitals and the author attributed the
decision of cost reduction through reduced capacity to the absence of other monitoring and evaluation
tools. Differences in terms of hospital beds are observed not only between private and public hospitals
but also between northern hospitals and southern hospitals with 5,6 and 4,3 beds per 1000 inhabitants
respectively (Paterlini 2013). Optimization of resources was pursued not only by reducing beds but also
by increasing their  occupancy from roughly  76% to  79% between  1998 and 2007.  The European
Hospital and Healthcare Federation (2011) further suggested that the usage of hospital resources has
been improved considering that inpatient surgical interventions per 100.000 inhabitants were reduced
by 11,6% in the period 1998-2008. Medical staff increased in average by 4,8% between 1997 and 2004
(Lozzi 2008). The number of nurses did not increase, maintaining Italy's peculiar composition of staff,
that is more physicians than average European values and less nurses than average European values.
More specifically, in 2004 Italy had 4,2 physicians and 7,0 nurses per 1.000 inhabitants while the EU
average was 3,5 physicians and 7,3 nurses per 1.000 inhabitants (Hofmarcher 2006, OECD 2009, The
World Bank 2014). The increased number of physicians accompanied by the reduction of beds led to an
increase in the number of physicians per bed. 
The complexity of procedures increased between 2000 and 2004 in hospitals located in North Italy. In
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South Italy,  although the  number of  hospitalizations is  higher,  the  complexity of  the interventions
performed, judged by the case mix, is inferior. A significant number of patients living in the south take
advantage  of  the  possibility  of  choosing  provider,  local  health  unit  and  even  region,  and  move
northwards (Donatini 2001). In fact, in 2004 of all acute care patients 6,9% decided to use healthcare
services  provided  by  institutions  located  in  North  Italy  despite  the  distance  from  their  place  of
residence in South Italy (Lozzi 2008). In such cases the costs are incurred by the region where the
patient resides and not by the region where services are provided inducing negative economic effects
on southern regions and worsening their already weak financial performance. However, such cases may
also foster the adoption of measure meant to increase quality of care from a complexity perspective in
all regions.
As aforementioned, hospitals costs are a relevant driver of the overall healthcare expenditure being thus
significantly responsible for the growth rate of the healthcare expenditure. As Lozzi (2008) indicated,
in the period 1992-2005 hospital costs have doubled and this is mainly due to the expansion of costs of
private accredited hospitals. For instance, in 2003 the average hospitalization cost in Italy was 3.493
euro (Lozzi 2008). Costs vary greatly from region to region and the average hospitalization costs per
inhabitant in 2004 was 782 euro, the lowest average level, 711 euro, was registered in Tuscany and the
highest, 1.134 euro, in Bolzano, a rich autonomous province located in North Italy.
The  cost  reimbursement  mechanisms  have  changed  several  times  along  the  years.  They currently
consist of prospective payments according to nationally defined rates that can be redefined at regional
levels  provided they are  not  higher.  Rates have  been set  for  (1)  diagnostic-related groups used  in
reimbursing inpatient care cases, (2) fees for service used in reimbursing specialist care and diagnostic
services and finally for (3) bed-day rates used in reimbursing long term care and rehabilitation. This
mechanism started in 1992 and it developed progressively. In the period 1978-1992 hospitals where
allocated  yearly  fixed  budgets  based  upon  historical  expenditure.  Before  that,  that  is  before  the
introduction of the national health system hospitals received their funds from the sickness fund, casse
mutue, on a bed-day rate basis (Donatini 2001).
According to  physicians European Hospital  and Healthcare Federation (2011) Italy had among the
highest ratios of physicians per inhabitant in 2008. There were 4,1 physicians per 1.000 inhabitants and
56% of them worked in hospital settings. The number of physicians, although still high, has decreased
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since 1999 when Italy had the highest ratio of physicians per 1.000 inhabitants, 5,7 (Donatini 2001). On
the other hand, the ratio of nurses per inhabitant was at the low extreme compared with other European
countries with 7,0 nurses per 1.000 inhabitants in 2008. There has been a significant increase since
1999  when  there  were  only  3  nurses  per  1.000  inhabitants  (European  Hospital  and  Healthcare
Federation 2011, Donatini 2001). Italy's under-supply of nurses and over-supply of physicians provokes
an inefficient allocation of resources (The Commonwealth Fund 2012).  In 1999 Greece and Italy were
the only two countries with a higher number of physicians than nurses.  
Remuneration of medical staff working in hospitals is done through salaries that vary depending on
their  position  and  level,  first  level  physicians,  dirigente  medico  di  primo  livello,  with  supporting
responsibilities  or  second  level  physicians, dirigente  medico  di  secondo  livello,  with  managerial
respnsabilites. As Reginato and Grosso (2011) reported the average national salary of Italian physicians
working in  hospitals  amounts  to  36.200 euro per  year.  When considering the minimum-maximum
range set at national level for physicians' remunerations, Italy is situated at the high extreme of EU
values with a minimum gross wage per month of 4.500 euro and a maximum gross wage per month of
12.000 euro. By correcting values with the purchasing power parity indicator, Italy is second only to
Belgium in the minimum-maximum range of salaries. Hospital physicians can increase their income by
also working in private settings.
Nurses'  remuneration  consists  of  a  basic  wage  and  productivity  bonuses  given  when  the  medical
director and/or the nurse officer consider the requirements have been met (Donatini 2001). In 2001 the
average monthly wage of a professional nurse, as reported in the International Labour Organization
Statistics Database (LABORSTA) was 1.723,07 euro, whereas for auxiliary nurses it was 1.351,07.
Wages increased until 2008, and the average annual growth rate between 2005 and 2008 was 5,4%
starting from an average wage of 1.817 euro for professional nurses working 36 hours per week in
2005, that is without considering overtime payments, and arriving at 1.926,77 euro in 2008 (World
salaries website, OECD 2013, LABORSTA). From 2008 to 2011, wages decreased at an 0,3% annual
rate due to the economic crisis and the financial constraints the Italian economy was facing, but  nurses'
remuneration was still competitive as, according to OECD (2013), the ratio of nurses wage to national
average wage1 was 1,0 in 2011.
1 The national average wage calculated by OECD considers full-time workers from all sectors of the country's economy.
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Concerning medical studies both physicians and nurses must acquire university degrees from either
public or private universities in order to be able to practice. Physicians must study not less than six
years  and  practice  in  a  hospital  setting  for  six  months  or  more.  Subsequently,  according  to  EU
regulations, they must pursue postgraduate specialization, for a minimum of two years in the case of
prospective general practitioners, allowing them to practice within any state member of the EU. Nurses
must finish a three years long university course and take a state examination to be able to practice
(Donatini 2001). Subsequently, they can pursue postgraduate specializations offered by universities or
by healthcare institutions or other education agencies (Robinson and Griffths 2007).
The Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital is located in the municipality of Forli' (Emilia-Romagna Region).
The Regional  Health Authority  of Emilia-Romagna consists  of 11 local  health units,  four research
hospitals, four university hospitals and one hospital trust that serve the region's 4.459.246 inhabitants
plus patients coming from other regions that accounted to 14% of the total patients in 2011 and 13,8%
in 2010 as reported by the region. The total health expenditure amounted to 8.514 billion euro in 2011
and 41,56% was hospital related. The regional per capita expenditure in 2011 was 1.909 euro slightly
above the 2010 expenditure, 1.902 euro. In the 2001-2010 period Emilia-Romagna registered a 3,4%
growth of the per capita health expenditure, including the inflow of patients from other regions, which
is in line with the national average growth of 3,6% for the same period. In 2011 the region had 20.439
hospital beds out of which 77,6% were public and the remaining 22,4% were privately accredited. For
the same year the region reported to have had 3,72 hospital beds in acute care per 1.000 inhabitants and
0,88 for long stay and rehabilitation. Waiting times for interventions are in line with national targets
except for hip replacement and oncology. The long waiting lists for hip replacement are due to the high
number of patients coming from across the country to the renowned Rizzoli Research Hospital located
in Bologna. The employees of the Regional Health Authority of Emilia-Romagna were 62.294 in 2011
slightly less than in 2010, 62.527. The number of physicians increased modestly in the two year period
from 9.121 to 9.140 (The Emilia-Romagna Regional Health Service 2013).
The region's well know high quality of care is due to a series of efforts in improving healthcare delivery
such as 'hospital for care intensity” that started in 2012 with the aim of organizing hospital areas not
based  on  pathologies  but  based  on  level  of  care  required  (The  Emilia-Romagna  Regional  Health
Service  2013).  Additionally,  the  region started  in  2013  the  project  SOLE,  a  network  that  renders
accessible  the  clinical  history  of  all  individuals  that  give  their  formal  consent.  For  this  purpose
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Electronic Health Records are being created in all 11 local health units and six large hospitals that will
enable new models of care, cost reductions and higher quality through reduced risks of medical errors,
time savings  and easier  transfers  among providers (Gallelli  and Darchini  2013).  Thomas Jefferson
University and the local health unit of Parma developed in partnership a project aimed at reducing
morbidity and mortality related to hospitalization. The project adopted in 2013 consists of assessing the
risks of hospitalization and mortality, starting from historical data, and then acting upon the results, in
order to reduce morbidity and mortality while decreasing utilization of hospital beds and emergency
room. Preventive measures are put in place by Medical Homes and in Parma alone 12 were opened in
2013 (Maio et al 2013). Although, the former two projects are still in their inception phase and thus not
implemented across the entire region the objective is to extend them in the near future.
2.3. Development of the Surgical Patient Path at Morgagni-Pierantoni
Hospital in Forli'
Since 2004 the two hospitals of the municipality of Forli' , Morgagni and Pierantoni merged giving
birth to the new Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital that serves a population of roughly 150.000 individuals
with its 34 specialties and 350 beds. Bringing together all surgical wards resulted into one operating
room block with eight specialties, that is thoracic surgery; vascular surgery; general surgery; ear, nose,
throat  surgery; urological surgery; orthopedic and traumatology surgery; breast  surgery,  and finally
ophthalmological surgery each with its own operating room. The operating room block has also three
anesthetic rooms and one recovery room (Padovani 2013).
In order to assess to work of the new institution, in 2005 the local health authority assigned the task to
report the performance of the hospital to a multidisciplinary team composed of managers, engineers,
anesthetists, nurses and surgeons. Initially, the underlying motivation was to ensure patient safety is
ensured in the new complex structure, but throughout time it evolved to including cost containment
considerations by optimizing resource utilization. The team aimed at aligning physicians' interests to
management's interests so as to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the operating room (Padovani
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2013).
The project developed for the prevention of medical errors consists of three main tools: (1) a general
checklist to ascertain patient identity, correct site and surgery type, (2) a more detailed checklist, and
(3) the Surgical Patient Path. The second type of checklist is being used in two different variations both
composed of similar detailed informations that must be collected by the operating room nurse in three
different  moments:  sign-in,  time-out,  and  sign-out.  The  Surgical  Patient  Path  consists  of  (1)  data
collection, (2) data analysis, and finally (3) presentation of results (Buccioli 2012). Data collection
refers to gathering data concerning the patient's path from the ward to the operating room and back.
This is done by an operator who uses a device called personal digital assistant to identify patients by
reading their bracelets in order to access a digital  list from which steps will be selected and times
recorded (Agnoletti et al 2013). The device's software allows the operator to see the patient's personal
and medical information in order to ascertain that the intervention went according to plan and if not to
ascertain that modifications are recorded. Once data is entered in the data recording system it is sent to
the  Operating  Room Management  System to be analyzed according to  an algorithm based on the
literature and the indications given by the professionals involved in the project (Buccioli 2012). Results
obtained are presented separately for the three profiles that have been created, i.e. surgeon, anesthetist
and manager (Agnoletti et al 2013). 
The  operator  in  charge  of  collecting  data  once  the  patient  has  entered  the  operating  room is  the
anesthetist  nurse,  who  uses  the  device  to  read  patient  bracelets  and  cards  used  to  record  room
entry/exit, the latter being identified as the easiest and fastest way of recording times. The path from
the ward to the operating room and back is registered by a healthcare assistant. For each path there can
be up to 16 steps (Figure 12) resulting into maximum 25 delta times (Figure 23). 
2 Agnoletti et al 2013 p. 3 
3 Agnoletti et al 2013 p. 5
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Figure 1: Steps of the Surgical Patient Path
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Figure 2: Delta times of the Surgical Patient Path
Two quality criteria have been introduced to ensure usefulness of data introduced in the system. The
first rule is to alert the operator when there are less than seven steps recorded as paths with less than
that cannot be correct. The second rule is to use a minimum-maximum range of values for acceptable
delta times that were defined by the physicians during the trials  of the implementation of the system
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between 2006 and 2008 (Figure 34) (Agnoletti et al 2013).
Figure 3: The second data quality rule
As mentioned above results can be accessed by surgeon, anesthetist and manager. Each profile has
subdivisions for more detailed information. The profile for surgeons has four subdivisions: S1 to give a
general  view of  the surgical  activity in  terms of  total  number of procedures,  five most  performed
4 Agnoletti et al 2013 p. 6
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procedures, average time and standard deviation; S2 for comparisons between different weeks, months
or  years;  S3  to  present  and  Induction-Surgery  Awakening  information  and  finally  S4  to  provide
information on the number of surgical procedure per DRG. The profile for anesthetists has also four
subdivisions:  A1 for  an  overall  view of  the  anesthesiological  activity;  A2  to  give  information  on
patients  who  changed  their  scheduled  pathway  and  where  they  were  taken  post  surgery:  A3  for
information on induction and awakening data on specific patients and A4 for statistical information on
anesthesia time, surgical time and recovery room time. The third profile for manager has five levels:
M1 provides information on the surgical activity in terms of total number of procedures, number of
scheduled and unscheduled procedures etc;  M2 shows the results of comparisons between surgical
wards; M3 shows detailed information on specific surgical wards; M4 provides efficiency indicators
also called key performance indicators and finally M5 shows a Trasport-Induction-Surgery-Awakening
graph in order to provide information on the average time and standard deviation of specific procedures
(Agnoletti et al 2013).
As Buccioli (2012) suggests the data collection process is centered around four main components: (1)
hardware through the use of a device, (2) software developed by hospital engineers, (3) logistics during
the  tracking  of  the  path,  and  last  but  not  least  (4)  the  human  component  that  allows  to  assign
responsibilities for data introduction to the anesthetist nurse. Padovani et al (2013) provide additional
description  of  the  project  through the  presentation  of  the  four  main ideas  it  was  based  upon:  (1)
inclusive approach in the sense that the personnel involved was constantly asked for feedback during
the development of the process, (2) ergonomics which refers to the fact the system was designed to be
user friendly so as to avoid giving extra burden to the operating room personnel, (3) third party data
collection is  the idea of  ensuring quality of  the data being introduced in the recording system by
assigning this task to the anesthetist nurse and not to the surgeon as it was initially planned, the shift of
tasks was done upon observation of the fact surgeons had the tendency of introducing biased data; the
final  idea  is  (4)  reuse  since  the  devices  were  already  available  in  the  hospital  which  was  a  cost
containment and resource optimization opportunity.
After the trials conducted in the 2006-2008 period the system became fully operative in 2009. Results
achieved between 2009 and  2011 led  to  an  award  from the  European Commission  as  '...a  public
healthcare organization in Europe that represents the best case of Smart Public Service Delivery in a
Cold Economic Climate' (Padovani 2013 p. 2). The Operating Room Management System has not only
allowed to reduce clinical risk of surgical patients but also to use available resources in a more efficient
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way. In the period 2009-2011 no cases of errors during the surgical path were registered whereas during
the previous two years, 2007-2008, there was one case of wrong site surgery, one case of wrong person
surgery and also two cases of near misses of wrong site surgery. Operating room occupancy increased
from 71% in 2009 to 79% in 2010, the number of unscheduled procedures decreased from 25% in 2009
to 14% in 2011 while at the same time the number of scheduled procedures increased from 75% in
2009 to 86% in 2011, high complexity procedures (>120 min) increased from 19% in 2009 to 21% in
2011 without negatively affecting overtime work. In fact, overtime work decreased from 28% in 2009
to 21% in 2011, allowing to reduce related costs from 524.000 euro in 2009 to 497.000 euro in 2010
(Agnoletti et al 2013, Padovani et al 2013). Additionally, the costs saved due to the Operating Room
Management System are greater than those incurred for its implementation, and Agnoletti et al  (2013)
described the project as being of very low cost since it represents 0,0019% of the surgical costs on an
annual basis.
During the development and implementation phase several obstacles have been faced. First of all, the
'hypertrophic state bureaucracy'  and 'atavistic diffidence of innovation' characterizing Italian culture
were responsible for the initial unsupportive organizational climate (Agnoletti et al 2013). Nonetheless,
the conflict of interests between the medical and managerial professionals pursuing different objectives
characterizing  not  only the  Morgagni-Pierantoni  Hospital  has  also  played a  significant  role  in  the
struggle  of  adopting this  innovative system. Attempts to  facilitate  the acceptance  of the  Operating
Room Management System consisted of: organizing team meetings for feedback and training; using the
feedback during the development process for changes such as assigning the task of data collection to
the anesthetist nurse and no longer to the surgeon, and using dashboards to draw attention on results
achieved and increase motivation (Padovani et al 2013). 
Regarding the limits of the Operating Room Management System Buccioli (2012) stressed two aspects:
firstly, the quality of the results depends on the quality of the data introduced by the anesthetist nurse
and secondly, efforts must be put in place to sustain the hardware and software.
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3. JOB SATISFACTION  
3. 1. Job Satisfaction Theories 
For managers, identifying the factors that influence job satisfaction is crucial in order to be able to
understand employees' commitment and performance. Hence, there is a waste array of contributions in
the literature trying to shed light on what employees consider to be particularly relevant for their work
since it was widely accepted that remuneration alone cannot satisfy employees on the long run. The
aim of this subchapter is to provide a general view of  the most important job satisfaction theories.
Bhatnager and Srivastava (2012) describe job satisfaction to be an attitudinal variable that refers to
emotional response to work and working conditions meaning that job related characteristics are key
determinants  of  an  employee's  level  of  satisfaction.  Although  relevant,  they  are  not  the  only
determinants.  In fact, a variety of other factors have been identified in the literature that can be divided
into two main categories: personal characteristics of the employee and social factors. However,  the
factors  that  compose  each  category  varies  greatly  according  to  the  theoretical  approach  adopted
(Saifuddin et al 2012). 
As Saifuddin et al (2012) suggest in their literature review, the standard classification of job satisfaction
theories consists of dividing them into content theories and process theories. The former consist of
theories that are meant to identify and categorize the determinants of job satisfaction into primary,
secondary and high level factors according to their importance, whereas the latter consists of theories
that examine the type of determinants that are particularly relevant.
The first remarkable contribution in terms of content theories was given in 1943 by Abraham Maslow
in his paper Theory of Human Motivation where he presented the Hierarchy of Needs that contains five
different types of needs all human have, although we might perceive them differently and feel different
urges to pursue them. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is the most renowned theory in the literature on
human needs and it set the foundation for the development of future job satisfaction theories. The five
types of needs presented are: (1) physical needs such as nutrition, clothing and shelter, (2) safety needs
that refer to living conditions that do not jeopardize one's life and freedom, (3) social needs in the sense
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of being part of a community, (4) esteem needs such as prestige and recognition, and finally (5) self-
actualization that concerns personal growth. In 1959, another contribution was given by Herzberg's
Two-Factor Theory that distinguishes between (1) motivators also called job satisfying factors such as
achievement,  recognition  and responsibility,  and  (2)  hygiene  factors  like  remuneration,  supervisor,
working conditions, company policy that are necessary in order to avoid dissatisfaction, meaning that
even if they do not induce satisfaction directly they lay the grounds for an environment where job
satisfaction can be achieved. A third relevant content theory is the two components Theory X & Y
developed in 1960 by Douglas McGregor stating that the average individual intrinsically dislikes work
and therefor s/he needs and prefers to be directed (negative assumptions from Theory X) or that s/he
intrinsically likes work and therefore does not need external motivators (positive assumptions from
Theory Y). Finally, the last  content theory, Achievement Theory,  was presented by McCelelland in
1961  and  developed  around  the  idea  of  high  level  needs  from  Maslow's  Hierarchy  of  Needs.
McCelelland suggested that individuals might like their work and be satisfied with it  even without
external motivators because some people have a natural drive to achievement and success and they
value the power received through work more than other factors such as remuneration.
Saifuddin et al (2012) identified five process theories. The first one, Theory of Equity, developed in
1963 by J. Stacy Adams, is based on the idea that employees' satisfaction is related to the level of
equity between effort they put at work and personal achievements. Hence, they are satisfied when their
results are gratifying and in line with their co-workers' situations. The second one, Vroom's Expectancy
Theory  (1964)  is  centered  around  three  factors  that  lead  to  job  satisfaction:  valance  -  personal
preference  for  a  specific  outcome,  expectancy  -  likelihood  to  reach  that  specific  outcome  and
instrumentality  -  usefulness of the outcome in achieving a higher goal. The third one,  Expectancy
Model (1968), proposed by Porter and Lawler states that workers are motivated when the effort-reward
relation presents a high probability and they feel satisfied when outcomes meet the expectations. The
fourth theory, Goal-Setting Theory (Locke, 1968), suggested that the type of objectives presented to
employees and supportive feedback are key elements for employees. Finally, the Job Characteristics
Theory  (Hackman  and  Oldham  1975-1976)  correlates  effective  performance  to  sense  of
meaningfulness of work (Saifuddin et al 2012).  
According to Lambrou et al (2010) theories on motivators and job satisfaction determinants can be
classified into the following categories: (1) theories that focus on needs: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs,
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Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory, McClelland's Achievement Theory and Aldersfer's Theory that argues
that people have three types of core needs managers have to focus on in order to motivate effectively:
existence - basic needs, relatedness - need of having interpersonal relations, and growth - desire of
completing  meaningful  work  leading  to  self-actualization  (Value  Based  Management  2014);  (2)
theories that focus on external motivating factors:  Skinner's Reinforcement Theory arguing that the
organizational environment must be designed by bearing in mind that employees repeat actions with
positive results  and cease  actions  with  negative results  (Management  Study Guide 2014),  and (3)
theories that focus on internal motivating factors: Adam's Equity Theory, Vroom's Expectancy Theory,
Locke's Goal Setting Theory.
Depending on the approach used,  job satisfaction can be assessed globally or more specifically by
considering different relevant work aspects. Bhatnager and Srivastava (2012) suggested that in order to
identify  job  satisfaction  the  following  aspects  must  be  taken  into  consideration:  work,  quality  of
supervision, professional relations, promotion opportunities and remuneration. The aggregate level of
satisfaction of each domain constitutes the employee's job satisfaction.
Applying the above mentioned theories to healthcare employees must be done by acknowledging their
limitations. First, none of the theories can give a comprehensive explanation of the job satisfaction
mechanism. Although they might all be valid none of them is error-free and applicability depends on
the context. Second, they have been developed in North America and thus they reflect characteristics of
the American culture meaning they must be applied cautiously to different cultural  contexts. More
specifically, what has to be considered is the following series of factors: (1) whether the culture is more
individualistic or collectivistic, (2) preoccupied with material possessions (masculinity) or more with
social well-being (femininity), (3) extent to which obedience towards authorities be it a manager or the
country's leader is generally expected or not, and (4) power distance to reflect on the general attitude
towards  risk  and  ambiguity  (Saifuddin  et  al  2012).  Furthermore,  when  applying  the  theories  to
healthcare employees additional considerations must be taken into account starting from the premise
that  job  satisfaction is  crucial  in  determining the  quality  of  medical  care  and the  level  of  patient
satisfaction. According to the literature, healthcare professional's satisfaction is mostly due to: decision-
making  autonomy,  effective  communication,  working  arrangements,  supervision,  problem  solving
attitude promoted at the workplace and ability to express one's point of view freely (Bhatnager and
Srivastava 2012).
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In recent years there have been several changes in the healthcare sector that affect physicians directly.
Changes with a positive impact on job satisfaction are: increased training possibilities and reduction of
working  hours,  whereas  changes  with  a  negative  impact  on  job  satisfaction  are:  increased
administrative burden and increased pressure regarding time and efficiency in an attempt to contain
costs considering the increase in health care costs of the last years (Bovier and Perneger 2003). The
increase in job related stress induced by these changes affects healthcare professionals in more than one
way as evidence suggests: quality of care provided and also personal wellbeing (Pisljar et al 2011).
More specifically, what seems to cause stress is work overload, feeling poorly managed and resourced
as well as dealing with patients suffering (Pisljar 2011, Ramirez et al 1996). Prolonged stress leads to
burnout  situations  attributable  to  two  categories  of  factors:  burden  of  unsupportive  relations  with
patients,  their  families  and  co-workers  and  personal  factors  such  as  intellectual  stimulation  and
professional status/esteem (Ramirez et al 1996). Additionally, administrative burden plays an important
role in impeding job satisfaction (Bovier and Perneger 2003).
All  things  considered,  job  satisfaction  of  healthcare  professionals  do  not  depend  on  economic
incentives  only.  Lambrou et  al  (2010) showed that  physicians  and nurses from public  hospitals  in
Cyprus valued non economic incentives more than economic incentives. The authors argued that these
results are in line with Laubach's and Fischbeck's (2007) findings on motivators of German physicians.
Personal growth opportunities and achievements seem to be the most important motivator according to
Lambrou et al (2010).
In order to explain the human dynamics in the operating room Helmreich and Davies (1996) suggested
using  Edwards'  (1988)  SHEL model  which  argues  that  staff  behavior  is  influenced  by:  software,
hardware, environment and liveware. Software refers to the way of working in the operating room, e.g.
sterile equipment, hand washing rules and other patient safety measures. Hardware and environment
refer  to  the equipment  used.  This may be described by the  producer  to be the result  of extensive
ergonomic research and thus 'user friendly',  but it is often perceived by the staff as an 'ergonomic
nightmare'. Although devices might have an ergonomic design the final result of putting them together
might differ. It is rarely the case that an OR is entirely renewed at once thus devices from different
periods are put together in what might not be a user friendly environment with lights, gas lines, head
and  ground-level  cables.  Hence,  tackling  the  problem  of  poor  job  satisfaction  through  medical
technology tends to lead to a further increase in workload as employees need to acquire new knowledge
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and skills increasing job complexity. Together with expectations of high performance they risk to be
perceived  as  extra  stressors  (Pisljar  et  al  2011). Finally,  liveware  refers  to  the  fact  that  surgical
interventions impose team work and not all teams are equally efficient. Several factors influence team
spirit and hierarchy is a crucial one even though it may vary considerably also depending on cultural
factors. For instance, in the USA it is not uncommon for the surgeon to be the team leader, whereas in
Canada,  UK  and  Australia  work  dynamics  are  not  normally  led  by  the  surgeon.  Effective
communication is also a key element and Helmreich and Davies (1996) reported that operating room
personnel have overwhelmingly indicated communication as an area that requires improvement. 
Communication is not important only for clarity but also for receiving feedback and encouragement.
Krogstad et al (2006) found that Norwegian physicians and nurses valued greatly positive feedback and
associated  this  with  an  underlying  need  of  appreciation.  Lambrou  et  al  (2010)  reported  that
appreciation by managers and colleagues is the main motivator of physicians and nurses as the study of
public  hospital  personnel  from Cyprus  indicated.  The  need of  supportive  feedback  is  particularly
relevant  for  nurses  which  report  it  to  be  the  main  factor  leading  to  job  satisfaction  and  work
organization as the second most important factor (Krogstad et al 2006). For physicians, opportunities
for development represent the leading factor although supportive feedback is also reported as being
particularly relevant (Ibid). Other differences in the way nurses and physicians perceive motivators
were reported by Lambrou et al (2010) who stated that nurses are more motivated by remuneration than
physicians, and nurses showed higher general satisfaction levels than physicians. Differences have also
been  revealed  between  age  subgroups.  Older  physicians,  age  range  46-55,  and  older  nurses,  >55
seemed to be more satisfied with their jobs than their younger co-workers (Lambrou et al 2010, Bovier
and  Perneger  2003).  Plausible  causes  for  the  lower  levels  of  satisfaction  of  younger  health
professionals might be lower income, prestige and autonomy which are also accompanied by a less
developed professional network. These factors are not only responsible for lower satisfaction levels but
can also lead to burnout especially in single professionals (Bovier and Perneger 2003, Ramirez et al
1996).  Differences  in  satisfaction  regarding  work  burden  have  also  been  noted  between  gender
subgroups. Female personnel tend to be less satisfied due to the need of dedicating time and energy not
only  to  their  careers  but  also  to  their  families  for  whom they often  represent  the  main caregiver.
Additional subgroups divided by specialities showed that operating room personnel reported the lowest
level of satisfaction and psychiatrists reported the highest level (Bovier and Perneger 2003).  
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3. 2. Profession Specific Determinants of Job Satisfaction
For surgeons the risk of committing medical errors represents a significant burden as shown by a study
of 3.171 American and Canadian physicians reporting that 92% of them declared to have been involved
in a case of medical errors (Waterman et al 2007). The strong impact on surgeons' morale is, first,
showed by the fact that  70% attribute self-assessed medical  errors to individual  causes rather than
system causes and, second, errors that occurred in the previous three months have a significant large
impact on mental quality of life and may lead to burnout and depressive symptoms (Shanafelt et al
2009).  Prevention  of  medical  errors  strongly  relies  on  effective  communication  between operating
room  personnel.  A  survey  of  34  American  hospitals  showed  that  surgeons'  perception  of
communication  was  better  than  nurses'  perception.  Furthermore,  nurses  reported  lower  quality  of
teamwork with surgeons than among nurses (Carney et al 2010). Carney et al (2010) suggested that
what makes communication between surgeons and nurses less well perceived by nurses compared to
communication among nurses is related to the hierarchy of surgical departments where physicians have
the last say. If nurses feel their comments are not considered information flows are more likely to be
reduced. Attempts of improving information flows by implementing innovative measures are highly
dependent on employee's perception of his/her ability to do well in the new circumstances as well as on
the perceived significance of the innovative measure (Ibid).   
For anesthetists the consequences of heavy workload have a strong negative impact on job satisfaction
Nonetheless, the effects of stress and fatigue on the quality of care provided seem to be a delicate
matter. In fact, a study performed on 279 Californian anesthetists showed that half of the participants
admitted to have made or have witnessed an error due to fatigue (Gaba et al 1994 cited by Flin 2003).
They declared to be aware of the fact that being tired and stressed makes them work less effectively but
they were reluctant to the idea of facing higher probabilities of committing errors despite their broad
knowledge on how the human body works. Flin et al (2003) argued that the underlying cause might be
fear  of  vulnerability  as  shown  by  the  fact  their  coping  strategies  do  not  normally  involve
communicating that their workload is excessive and this is particularly true for junior anesthetists. Flin
et al (2003) believed that although workplace behaviors can be culturally determined their findings on
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anesthetists' reluctancy to admit associations between work overload and quality of care provided is not
a singular evidence of their study of Scottish anesthetists. Similar results have  been reported in studies
made in Italian, Swiss, German and American hospitals (Sexton et al 2000, Helmreich and Davies 1996
cited by Flin et  al 2003). Eighty four per cent of the 222 Scottish anesthetists interviewed by Flin
declared  they  committed  errors  in  the  operating  room.  Errors  regarding  drug  administration  and
operating  list  errors  were  the  most  frequent,  and  only  39%  considered  that  errors  were  handled
appropriately.  In  order  to  improve  working  conditions  and  work  satisfaction  they  indicated
communication and teamwork, staffing resources and training as main aspects to be addressed (Flin et
al 2003). High job dissatisfaction is one of the causes leading Finnish anesthetists to consider changing
profession (Lindfors et al 2009). Factors that made them seriously consider the possibility of quitting
their  job were conflicts  at  the  workplace,  low job  control,  stress and organizational  injustice that,
according to the same sample, could be solved by improving communication and establishing trust and
respect. The importance of communication was also stressed by Flin et al (2003), who stated that 40%
of the anesthetists declared that they considered briefing and debriefing to be relevant communication
tools for good teamwork and patient safety. 
The literature review on job satisfaction of hospital nurses made by Lu et al (2012) indicated that job
satisfaction does not depend solely on job characteristics but also on individual expectations. Results
showed  that  causes  and effects  of  job  satisfaction  for  hospital  nurses  were similar.  Causes  of  job
satisfaction  are  intrinsically  related  to  working  conditions,  organizational  environment  and
commitment, job stress, role conflict and ambiguity, and finally role perception and role content. The
elements playing a key role are working conditions, interaction, professional relationships, work itself,
workload, economic and non economic rewards, promotion opportunities, decision-making power, job
security and organizational policies (Figure 45). In considering determinants of job satisfaction Glazer
and Gyurak (2008) argued that it must be distinguished between culture specific elements and other
elements that are not dependent on culture because they are specific to the profession. Based on their
study of nurses working in   Italy, Israel, UK, USA and Hungary they reported that work overload,
performing certain tasks and patient type are job specific impeding factors to achieving high levels of
work satisfaction,  whereas  conflictual  professional  relations,  staff  shortage  and disorganization  are
stressors reported by Italian nurses as factor that make them feel on 'time pressure' and dissatisfied with
their  jobs.  Additionally,  what  makes  operating room nurses  to  suffer 'time pressure'  is  uncertainty
5 Lu et al 2012 p. 1021
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regarding shifts, the need to work quickly, handle precision instruments and to master complex working
techniques as well  as medical errors.  The most powerful stressor reported by OR nurses is patient
safety and the most frequent is administrative feedback according to Chen et al (2009). The same study
showed that nurses are not particularly motivated by the economic rewards they receive for extra work.
Not all operating room nurses have the same satisfaction levels. Nurses older than 40 years present
lower  satisfaction  and  are  more  stressed.  This  could  be  related  to  difficulties  in  adapting  to  the
changing conditions of an operating room as technology is rapidly advancing (Lambrou et al 2010).
Moreover, nurses who have no children are more stressed than those who have children and a rich
family life (Chen et al 2009). 
Figure 4: Sources of job satisfaction for nurses
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4. MEDICAL ERRORS
4.1. Magnitude of the problem
Problem solving processes start from acknowledging the presence of a problem. Seiden and Barach
(2006)  suggested  that  wrong-side/wrong-site,  wrong-procedure,  and  wrong-patient  adverse  events
(WSPEs) are not as rare as patients and clinicians believe. In fact, they argue that each year in the US
there are between 1.300 and 2.700 cases.
Leape et al (1998) described healthcare as being the world's most challenging environment for ensuring
safety.  Its  complexity  gives  multiple  opportunities  for  clinicians  to  commit  errors  of  different
magnitudes.  Ninety-two  per  cent  of  the  3.171  physicians  interviewed  in  the  study  performed  by
Waterman et al (2007) declared that they had taken part in a case of medical error be it a near miss,
minor error, or a serious error. This finding does not only reflect the need to address the problem due do
its frequency but also because healthcare is a setting where harmless and serious errors are relatively
easy to be confused (Pani & Chariker 2004). According to the American Institute of Medicine serious
medical errors are responsible for 100.000 deaths annually resulting in the eighth leading cause of
death  in  the  US  as  their  report  from  1999  suggested  (Awad  et  al  2005).  The  American  Joint
Commission on Accreditation  of  Healthcare  Organizations  (JCAHO) has  identified  communication
failures in the operating room as a key determinant of medical errors and thus, in 2004-2005 it declared
improvements in communication as a main objective for increasing patient safety and especially for
reducing WSPEs (Awad et al 2005, Makary et al 2006). 
From the overall adverse events Flin et al (2006) found that almost half concerned surgical patients.
They are determined by various causes including technical skills such as surgical expertise of clinicians
and non technical skills such as team coordination, soundness of the decision making process, and
leadership style. Clinicians' contribution to medical error episodes has to be acknowledged without
overestimating it. It is true that good practices are needed in order to minimize error risks, but system
features determine spaces for errors to be committed and the consequences. Traditional research has put
a lot of emphasis on people as unreliable elements of the healthcare system without considering the fact
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that clinicians' contribution consists mainly of adding the final ingredient to an already existing mix of
risk factors.  By struggling to identify root-causes through the agents involved in cases of medical
failures,  system features have long neglected (Leape et  al  1998). Awad et  al  (2005) also criticized
traditional  research  by pointing  out  that  surgical  outcomes  were  centered  around the  skills  of  the
surgeon and around the risk factors presented by the specific  case taken into consideration largely
ignoring  other  factors  such  as  communication  and  teamwork  that  have  proven  to  be  of  great
importance.  An additional  weak point  was identified by Christian et  al  (2006) who suggested that
studies of adverse events are retrospective trying to reconstruct events by using interview data and
hospital records, thereby risking to work with information that could be incomplete. They stated that
based on findings of retrospective studies they did not expect to identify safety compromising events in
their prospective study of 10 complex cases of general surgery. Still, 11 safety-compromising events
were found and only two would have been discovered by using hospital records. Cristian et al (2006)
argued this  finding cannot  be considered study specific  because  it  is  consistent  with other  studies
conducted by Kable et al (2002), Leape et al (1991), and Kohn et al (2001).
Acknowledging  the  magnitude  of  the  problem and  its  complexity  has  led  the  main  actors  of  the
American healthcare  system to organize the first  multidisciplinary conference on medical  errors in
1996 with the participation of the American Medical Association (AMA), the Annenberg Center for
Health  Sciences,  the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  and  JCAHO.  The
following year the Veterans Affairs National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) was established and
became one of the founders of the National Patient Safety Partnership together with JCAHO, AMA,
Veterans Affairs (VA), the American Hospital Association, the American Nurses Association, and the
American Association of Medical Colleges joining forces in a nationwide effort to reduce cases of
errors based upon the belief that errors occur in all health care settings but they can and have to be
minimized.  NPSF's  declared  goals  were  to  (1)  promote  research  on  medical  errors,  (2)  spread
knowledge on prevention tools also by taking into consideration inputs from other high risk industries
such as nuclear power and aviation,  and (3) improve communication given its relevance to patient
safety (Leape et al 1998). In 2003, JCAHO had translated its findings on prevention of medical errors
in a measures to be used by healthcare providers called the Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong
Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery. This consists of  (1) preoperative verification of patient
identity, side, site, and procedure together with the surgeon, (2) site marking, and (3) a time out before
incision for a final confirmation, as preoperative concerns must be clarified and patient agreement must
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be given in all cases. However, it is unrealistic to expect that the protocol will prevent all cases of
adverse events (Kwaan et al 2006).
Studies have shown that large percentages of clinicians have been involved in cases of medical errors.
Waterman et al (2007) found that 92% of the 3.171 clinicians participating in the study took part in
such a case and Flin et al (2006) found that 74% of surgeons and 44% of nurses from the overall 352
operating room clinicians from 17 Scottish hospitals admitted they made errors in the operating room.
Surgeons' errors concerned equipment, sterile field, and list accuracy, whereas nurses' errors concerned
incomplete records, lack of consent, and communication breakdowns. A much more extensive study of
safety in the operating room performed by the Harvard School of Public Health analyzed all wrong-site
surgeries from an important American malpractice insurer in the period 1985-2004. In total 25 cases
were found from a total of 2.826.367 surgeries. For 13 of the cases medical records were found, and
thereby root-cause analyses were conducted. The 13 wrong-site surgeries resulted in 10 temporary-
insignificant  consequences,  two temporary-significant  consequences,  and one  permanent-significant
consequence. The expression wrong-site surgery refers to all detected cases performed on the wrong
person, the wrong organ or on the wrong vertebral level  (Kwaan et al  2006). The reported rate  of
occurrence of the study is one in 111.054 interventions but it can vary considerably from specialty to
specialty. A particularly risky specialty seems to be hand surgery with rates of occurrence four times
higher, one in 27.686 interventions (Meinberg and Stern 2003 cited in Kwan et al 2006).  
4.2. Determinants 
Root-cause analysis of adverse events from high risk domains suggests that human factors are more
common determinants than technical (Flin et al 2003). Hence, implementing successful measures to
prevent medical error requires a thorough understandings of what are the psychological causes leading
humans to err and assessment of the extent to which  human oriented measures can solve the problem.
Pani  and  Chariker  2004)  argued  that  although  personal  responsibility  cannot  be  disregarded
organizations have to assume their share of responsibility and discover statistically preventable errors
to be able  to  implement  measures aiming at  decreasing the impact  of the causal  factors.  Personal
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responsibility  should  not  be  exacerbated  by  performing  root-cause  analysis  focused  solely  on
identifying who is to blame for an episode of clinical error. Surgical errors are often due to a lack of
safety habits. Focusing on the professional directly involved in the specific case of medical error and in
correcting  their  behavior  is  neither  constructive  for  the  overall  system  nor  for  the  professionals
involved. Staff needs to operate in a blame-free environment where they are given the possibility of
learning  from their  mistakes  and  from the  mistakes  of  others.  The  level  of  stress  also  has  to  be
appropriately managed. Firth-Cozens (2001) reported that healthcare workers in Great Britain were
more stressed than other professionals. Stress levels varied between trusts indicating that work related
stress depends on organization-specific factors. Consequences of error episodes can even be extended
on long term when practitioners involved become more anxious and cautious resulting in a defensive
style of practicing medicine characterized by limited access to specific procedures and poorer patient
care (Waterman et al 2007, Firth-Cozens 2001).
Edmonson (1996) showed that reported drug errors were more frequent in units with better quality of
relationships, higher performance, and democratic leadership behaviors from nurse managers indicating
that knowledge of errors depend on willingness to report them. In order for individuals to report errors
a non punitive culture must be established where reports are handled productively and not as means for
assigning  blame.  Two  particular  fertile  grounds  for  errors  to  occur  are  organizations  where
responsibilities  are  not  well  defined  and  ambiguity  gives  multiple  opportunities  for  misguided
judgements even when professionals strive to  do their  best.  According to psychologists  an unclear
transfer of responsibility, anxiety and anger has an unconscious impact on work by distracting people
from  the  task  they  are  performing  (Edmondson  1996).  Also,  in  organizations  where  staff  is
overconfident that mistakes are something that does not happen 'around here' patient safety is more at
risk than where the risk is admitted and addressed (Pani and Chariker 2004). In their effort to present
the psychological sphere of errors typical to the medical practice, Pani and Chariker (2004) further
suggested that chronic workload impedes individuals from considering all aspects of the problems that
would normally be considered because knowledge that is available in principle may not be deployed.
Other factors that lead to errors are time pressure, interruption, tasks that are deceptively familiar and
involve very similar items. They lead to errors by precluding effective memory, optimal inferences,
recognition of unusual cases, and attention to details. Finally, they argue that medical judgments are not
immune to biases as (1) heuristic decision making processes in which clinicians base judgments on
what different factors represent to them based on previous experiences rather than what they really
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represent, and (2) hindsight biases concerning the tendency to consider past events as more predictable
than they are and especially more predictable than they initially seemed to be (Ibid). 
Operating rooms are very complex environments where safety and performance rely heavily on how
well information flows. In order to understand risk factors before they cause errors Christian et  al
(2006) performed a prospective study on ten complex cases of general surgery. The results showed that
patient safety and performance were negatively affected by communication breakdowns, workload and
competing tasks. Communication breakdowns alone led to oversights in patient preparation, waste of
resources, overuse of staff, delays, and decision uncertainty. To ensure a deep understanding, two types
of analysis were performed. The first one aimed at identifying safety-compromising events that could
lead to adverse events, and the second one to identify system features that might affect patient safety
and case progression. Safety-compromising events were due to the the following contributing factors:
high  workload,  hand off  events  consisting of  complete  transfer  of  care  giving activities  from one
professional to another due to the former's need of physically leaving the operating room, inexperience,
patient  characteristics,  and  hierarchy.  Harm  to  patients  was  prevented  in  most  case  thanks  to
verifications and checks that acted as compensation factors. System features that affected patient safety
and case progression were deficiencies regarding information flow, coordination of competing tasks
and workload. Having to perform competing tasks that both require attention and accuracy decreased
efficiency considerably  (Firth-Cozens 1995).  Findings  regarding information  flows  showed that  in
average there were nine events per case in which information was either degraded or lost for an overall
of 88 events. Among these, 76 had important consequences: 29 created uncertainty among staff, 19
induced delays in case progression, 15 increased workload, six led to resource waste, six generated risk
situations for the patient and one led to the last-minute cancellation of an intervention. Twenty-two per
cent of cases of information loss were temporally linked to hand offs. Communication events between
surgeons and pathologists proved to have the highest risk of information degradation or loss. Similar
results regarding surgeons were reported by Greenberg et al (2007) who showed that surgeons were
involved in most cases of communication breakdown. Workload and competing tasks, the second type
of system factors that affected patient care, refer to the need of performing patient-centered tasks and
auxiliary tasks such as counting instruments, retrieving resources, discussing case management of other
patients, and so on. Although auxiliary tasks are part of  operating room work they distract attention
from the patient and 12 instances were found in which the provider was distracted during high risk
phases of the intervention, was unable to perform patient-centered tasks because his attention was on
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performing auxiliary tasks, and case progression was delayed. The most time consuming auxiliary task
was the instruments counting protocol  accounting in average for 14,5% of the incision time. What
made it particularly time consuming was the risk of committing errors while counting. In fact, in the
nine observed cases there were 17 instances in which the counting presented inconsistencies and in 11
of these instances other team members were distracted. Another drawback of the counting protocol was
given by the fact that while engaged in performing this task the scrub nurse responded to surgeon's
requests with significant delays. Benefits of the counting protocol are debatable since manual counting
seems to be at risk of error as shown by a study reporting that in 88% of cases of retained foreign
bodies all instruments have been accounted for (Gawande et al 2003 cited in Christian et al 2006).
Resource  procurement  by  the  circulating  nurse  is  another  auxiliary  task  that  impeded  the  normal
progression of the case and in some circumstances it forced the team to change technique. Auxiliary
tasks were observed in the high intensity and high-risk phases of the cases and five instances were
detected in which professionals were performing competing tasks compromising patient safety. For this
reason, observers agreed in consensus it would be safer if theses tasks were shifted where possible
towards low intensity or low risk phases. One relevant finding of this study was that workload, hand
offs, competing tasks and communication difficulties are not just 'annoying but accepted features' of the
OR, but are also contributing elements to reducing safety. Thus, they should not be underestimated, and
addressing them could be done efficiently by adopting measures that proved to be successful in the
aviation industry.  For instance,  preoperative briefings could be used as an instrument for setting a
common ground concerning the intervention plan and also for planning auxiliary tasks throughout the
various  phases  and  checklists  could  be  used  to  ensure  passage  of  information  during  hand  offs
(Christian et al 2006). 
Greenberg  et  al  (2007)  give  a  significant  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  patterns  of
communication failures through their study on malpractice claim. From the overall 444 claims 60 were
malpractice cases that resulted in harm to patients due to communication failures. Seventy-two percent
of the 60 cases involved a singular  communication breakdown,  23% involved two communication
breakdowns, and 5% involved more than two. The rates of occurrence were very similar between the
three phases of the surgical process - preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative - with 38%, 30%,
and 32% respectively. More than half of the interventions were scheduled or elective, 64%, only 13%
were urgent, and 14% were emergent. One of the key determinants of errors consisted of interactions
with co-workers and interactions with the system in the sense of environment. Co-workers' interactions
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proved to be particularly difficult where status asymmetry between agents involved was verified, e.g.
resident and attending, and when uncertainty concerning responsibilities was present. Thus, increasing
patient  safety in  the OR requires reduction of  communication breakdowns.  This is  a difficult  task
considering the high number of communicators taking part in the numerous communication activities
of an OR. The number of communication events is also very high in the OR reaching up to 74 per hour
for a charge nurse with a duration varying between 10 seconds and 10 minutes for an average duration
of  40  seconds  (Moss  and  Xiao  2004).  Intraoperative  communication  failures  are,  as  shown  by
Halverson et al (2011), mostly related with equipment and operation progress, with 36% and 24% of
cases observed in 150 hours of observation respectively. Equipment was also reported as the main topic
in the OR for charge nurses at three teaching hospitals accounting for 38,7% of cases followed by
patient readiness in 25,7% of cases, staff issues in 18,8% of cases, room assignment in 10,7% of cases,
and finally surgery schedule in 6,2% of cases (Moss and Xiao 2004).  Halverson et al (2011) suggested
that in order to prevent this type of failure in the OR additional efforts to ensure understanding by
technicians and nurses of resources needed during the intervention must be made. It is very important
to tackle efficiently this determinant factor of communication failures. The Veteran Affairs National
Center for Patient Safety suggested that 82% of analyses performed on their database in order to detect
root-causes of adverse events and close-call reports have identified communication failure as a causal
factor (SPOT Database, VA National Center for Patient Safety cited by Awad et al (2005)
Communication impacts safety and quality of care through its effect on situation awareness, the process
of information acquisition from people and devices. The  operating room is a complex setting and in
order  to  accomplish  its  goal  professionals  must  perform their  tasks  in  complete  awareness  of  the
situation. It is not useful for everybody to know everything at all times, but rather for the right person
to receive the right information at the right time. For this purpose coordination of team members is
essential.  The  effectiveness of  the  operating room team is  dependent  upon the extent  to  which its
members  engage in  effective information sharing events.  Complete communication events between
individuals are composed of the following steps: sender initiates message, receiver accepts message
and provides feedback, and finally sender double checks that message was understood as intended. In
their study Parush et al (2011) observed ten surgeries for an overall 461 communication events. Of
these,  49% were  susceptible  to  information  loss,  and  33% closed the  loop with  delay  due  to  the
receiver.  Situations  in  which  the  loop  was  not  closed  were  also  observed.  These  communication
problems compromise patient safety. 
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4.3. Preventive measures
Since  1998 JCAHO is  spreading  knowledge  on  the  impact  that  communication  and  collaboration
failures have on wrong-procedure,  wrong-site, and wrong-patient cases. In 2003 it promulgated the
Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery in order to
standardize part of the communication flow in the operating room and set quality standards (Makary et
al 2007, Kwaan et al 2006). Data suggested that the lack of standardization and team integration in the
operating room were intrinsically related to cases of communication failures (Lingard et al 2004 cited
in Awad et al 2005, Greenberg et al 2007). Even so, it would be unrealistic to expect that surgical errors
will always be avoided. For example, Kwaan et al (2006) identified in his study of malpractice claims
five cases that could not have been prevented with the protocol. In two cases the patients presented
multiple lesions and both surgeons and patients were unsure on the treatment. In one case a magnetic
resonance image from a referring hospital was used without realizing that it was from another patient
with the same name. In another case the surgeon changed procedure side and consent was given, but
the patient did not remember giving it because he was sedated. The last case concerned thoracic outlet
syndrome was flawed due  to  the  resection  of  the  wrong rib.  After  reviewing claims from a  large
American malpractice insurer over a period of 20 years, Kwaan et al (2006) suggested that the main
risk factors  of  wrong-site  surgeries  were high time pressure,  multiple  procedures during the  same
intervention,  emergency operations,  and participation  of  multiple  surgeons.  Therefore,  the protocol
cannot possibly solve all causes leading to wrong-site surgeries being a tool designed to maximize the
informational content of communication events. Furthermore, the protocol of site verification is time
consuming  and  requires  personnel  attention  especially  since  it  involves  redundancy  of  checks.
According to safety expert James Reason redundancy of checks raises the following issues: (1) under
conditions of particular time pressure professionals might feel it is necessary to neglect the protocol in
order to keep up with patient flow, (2) distracting and interrupting the professional in charge with data
recording is dangerous, (3) check points must be independent, and (4) if multiple checks imply multiple
professionals the process might become perceived as being too complicated increasing chances of not
being adequately followed (Kwaan et al 2006).
Similarities  between  the  aviation  industry  and  healthcare  together  with  the  decrease  in  error  rate
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registered  by  the  former have  led  to  several  attempts  of  applying  measures  taken in  the  aviation
industry in high risk settings of healthcare such as the  operating room (Awad et al 2005). Aviation
specific  successful  measures  adapted  and  applied  in  healthcare  comprise  briefings,  debriefings,
measurement of crew performance, and training through simulation. Potential benefits of implementing
briefings/debriefings  consist  of  transferring  information  in  real  time.  This  may lead  to  a  common
understanding  of  the  situation,  giving  the  opportunity  of  discussing  doubts  and  putting  all  team
members on the same page, setting standards on how to communicate. It also gives the opportunity of
planning the intervention collaboratively, and hence increasing teamwork perception (Ibid). Makary et
al  (2007) showed that  operating room briefings not only prevent wrong-procedure,  wrong-site,  and
wrong-patient cases, but also act as a tool for teamwork promotion between anesthesia and surgery
staff, and as a tool for taking into consideration different caregivers during the decision making process
in the operating room. Assessment of clinicians' perception on briefings and debriefings was performed
by Flin et al (2006) in 17 Scottish hospitals. Results from the 352 respondents showed that 79% of
nurses believed a briefing before incision was relevant for patient safety compared to 37% of surgeons.
Seventy eight per cent of nurses believed debriefings after intervention were relevant for patient safety
compared  to  44%  of  surgeons.  The  reluctance  showed  by  surgeons  in  considering  briefings  and
debriefings as effective safety mechanisms might be related with cultural resistance of operating rooms.
In fact, cultural resistance and the connection between cultural change and error reduction is a well
known concept  in  the  aviation  industry.  Addressing  medical  errors  is  a  complex process  from an
educational  perspective.  It  starts  with  spreading  knowledge  as  the  first  step  towards  changing
behaviors. Nonetheless, knowledge does not necessarily imply that attitudes or behaviors will change.
Professionals not only need to know the new procedure but also to perceive it as relevant (Makary et al
2007). The relevance of briefings is shown by the fact that the quality of communication in general
surgery has improved for surgeons and anesthetists in the post introduction period of briefings. Absence
of improvements for nurses may be due to the fact  that  briefings have been introduced in general
surgery only, and all  nurses have taken part  in the survey (Awad et  al  2005).  As for patient  care,
implementation of briefings resulted in improved administration of appropriate prophylactic antibiotics
and deep venous thrombosis prophylaxis  (DVT) relevant  for  patient  outcomes.  Other  results  from
University  of  Louisville  Hospital  also  show benefits  in  administration  of  prophylactic  antibiotics,
venous thromboembolism prophylaxis, intraoperative temperature observation, and glycemia besides
giving the certainty of correct patient identity and correct surgery site (Altpeter et al 2007). Briefings
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have also enabled surgery staff to cancel interventions scheduled to be performed on patients at high
risk  for  proceeding  for  reasons  such  as  undialyzed  end-stage  renal  disease  patient,  significantly
increased coagulation parameters, and patient self-administration of platelet inhibitor the night prior to
planned operation (Awad et al 2005). 
Different perceptions in the operating room do not concern only briefings and debriefings. They extend
to communication as surgeons and nurses report to consider it being at a better level than anesthetists.
Flin et al (2006) in their study performed in 17 Scottish hospitals also showed that surgeons had a
better perception of communication and leadership in the  operating room than trainee surgeons and
nurses.  Mills  et  al  (2008)  interviewed  surgical  staff  members  from  six  institutions  before  the
introduction of the Medical Team Training. They concluded that the most common pattern found in
five of the six institutions studied was that nurses and anesthetists had similar perceptions that differed
from those of surgeons that were more positive. In the only institution with different results surgeons
seemed to be more aware of the problematic aspects of communication,  situational  awareness and
organizational support. The staff from this facility had already received team training. Makary et al
(2006)  in  their  survey of  2.135  operating  room staff  from 60 hospitals  found that  perceptions  of
teamwork  with surgeons in  the  operating room differed significantly between surgeon and nurses.
Surgeons considered that everyone in the operating room was performing well in terms of teamwork.
They reported the quality of collaboration with other surgeons as 'high' or 'very high' in 85% of cases,
whereas nurses report 'high' or 'very high' level for collaboration with surgeons in only 48% of cases. In
other words, surgeons reported high levels of satisfaction regarding collaboration with co-workers from
their discipline, but they received low ratings and so did anesthetists. Nurses were given the highest
overall ratings. Differences in perception have also been reported by Sexton et al (2000) who studied
1.033  operating room personnel. They as well reported surgeons to have higher levels of teamwork
perceptions than anesthetists and nurses (Awad et al 2005). According to Makary et al (2006) the fact
that surgeons had a good perception of collaboration with nurses which was not reciprocated by the
latter  is  due to (1) different  understandings of what  good teamwork is,  (2) differences in training,
responsibilities,  authority  and  status  as  well  as  communication  styled  imposed  by  the  profession.
Surgeons  and  nurses  tend  to  communicate  differently,  surgeons  have  a  pragmatic  style  of
communicating, whereas nurses have a more holistic communication style (Ibid). 
Flin et al (2006) found among operating room staff support for an idea of invulnerability to fatigue and
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stress. Sixty three per cent of nurses and 52% of surgeons believed they worked equally well during the
critical phases of intervention despite being tired. Only half of the subjects from each category believed
that personal difficulties might affect their work. Only 40% of surgeons said they would communicate
to  other  team members  if  their  workload was  excessive  versus  69% of  nurses.  The reluctance  in
admitting the effects of stress and fatigue on performance has also been reported by Helmreich and
Davies (1996). Staff reported that they did not feel management put the same emphasis on patient
safety  as  they  did  because  managers  tend  to  be  more  preoccupied  with  other  goals  such  as  cost
containment or waiting lists. Only a third of the nurses and less than half of the surgeons believed that a
patient safety failure would concern the management more than a failure in cost containment, waiting
lists or reputation. Regarding alignment of the concerns of the clinicians versus the management 25%
of the surgeons did not feel that their concerns were listened by managers compared to 51% of the
nurses. Moreover, 59% of the nurses believed that surgeon's leadership style is autocratic, whereas 54%
of the surgeons believed the adopted leadership style was consultative, revealing the fact that nurses
reported to have reasons to feel dissatisfied with managers' and surgeons' attitudes towards them (Flin
et al 2006).
The importance of communication has been acknowledged at institutional level in the UK in early 2000
when courses on communication skills have been introduced by the Royal College of Surgeons of
England and by the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh (Flin et al 2006). Providers have also
focused on enhancing these skills in the  operating room by introducing Medical Team Trainings, a
measure that has been developed in 2003 by the American National Center for Patient Safety based
upon the crew resource management model used in aviation with the final aims of improving patient
safety and job satisfaction through communication, situational awareness and teamwork (Gillespie et al
2010, Mills et al 2008). After 150 hours of observation on how teamwork and communication evolved
in the operating room Halverson et al (2011) concluded that during the pre and post period there were
no differences  in  the  type of  communication failures.  They observed a  significant  decrease  in  the
occurrence rate of communication errors per hour; 0,737  before (standard error 0,098) and 0,270 after
the training, (standard error 0,060). Efficiency assessment of the Team Training curriculum must be
made cautiously because decreased compliance is a common phenomenon in the post training period
(Salas  et  al  2008  cited  in  Gillespie  et  al  2010).  Compliance  with  the  Team  Training  curriculum
registered a decrease from 86% at two weeks distance to 66% at four weeks distance (Halverson et al
2011).
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The 352 clinicians interviewed by Flin et al (2006) say they do not consider surgical errors as a sign of
incompetence and that they rarely saw errors due to lack of knowledge. Gillespie et al (2010) indicate
based on their literature review of 12 studies of team training intervention from UK and US that 70% of
the detected surgical errors are to be attributed to communication breakdowns.
Using innovative technological applications for improving patient safety through communication is a
solution to patient safety proposed by Moss and Xiao (2004) as well as Seiden and Barach (2006).
Automated patient tracking to monitor their location and readiness might make communication more
efficient  for  surgeons,  anesthesia  staff,  operating  room and  floor  nurses,  and  also  for  ambulatory
surgery staff.  In order for these applications to be efficient they must be developed following the
settings'  specificities.  Otherwise,  they  might  impact  operating  room functioning  negatively,  as  it
happened at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center  (USA) where a $43 million application was removed in
2003 because it was too time consuming and not helpful for patient safety (Moss and Xiao 2004).
Christian et  al (2006) give another example of the fact that not all safety measures are necessarily
beneficial,  considering  the  negative  effects  of  the  counting  protocol  aforementioned.  Parush  et  al
(2011) argued that many operating room devices are not designed to allow all staff access, assimilation
and utilization of critical information, instead of improving communication they increased ambiguity.
The  literature  review  conducted  by  Gillespie  et  al  (2010)  showed  that  efforts  to  improve
communication  have  registered  some  progresses,  but  given  the  cultural  resistance  specific  of  the
operating room setting the  process  of  culture  change must  be sustained through persistent  efforts,
behaviors must be monitorized, and feedback must be provided in order to reinforce desired attitudes.
One of the problems existing in  operating rooms is given by the fact that nurses tend not to express
their concerns regarding patient care to surgeons. Makary et al (2006) suggested causes are likely to be
due to the operating room hierarchy which discourages such practices. Hence, organisational cultures
must be built where safety is perceived as everyone's objective and thereby everyone feels free to speak
up when patients might be harmed. Organization-wide efforts must be accompanied by team efforts of
smaller level in order to create a climate of openness towards admitting errors and learning from them.
Putting safety objectives on some professionals' shoulders more than on others might create tension and
inefficiencies.  Group  mentalities  are  not  common  in  healthcare  which  is  partially  responsible  for
allowing errors to happen. Medical teams are complex and composed of different members that prevent
each other from erring when they collaborate and communicate efficiently. Teams that work reliably in
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high risk environments present the following characteristics: (1) expertise and responsibilities are in the
hands of the same person, (2) team members all put effort into keeping up with the team's progresses,
(3) progress is an ongoing effort, (4) communication is coordinated, and (5) things that might go wrong
are considered ahead and prevented (Pani & Chariker 2004). Such cohesion often lacks in  operating
rooms. The necessity of being heavily competent in technical skills has maybe given little space to
developing nontechnical skills. Professionals tend to operate individually to complete their task rather
than operating as interdependent team members (Gillespie et  al  2010).  Evidence from the aviation
industry shows that even under fatigue conditions teams that have been working together made less
errors than teams that did not work together long. Taken individually long lasting team members made
more errors but  other team members compensated for them. This is  one of the reasons why good
teamwork is associated with lower levels of stress. Increasing safety requires first of all individual and
organizational change and learning. During the process of change the team represents a crucial element
because  team  leaders  heavily  influence  the  outcome  of  the  change  and  how well  team members
function together also determines the outcome (Firth-Cozens 2001). 
The quality of information flows together with trust and situational awareness define coordination in
the operating room and thereby the quality of care (Gillespie et  al  2010). Different perceptions of
communication and safety and the fact that surgeons have the best perceptions are reported by different
studies.  Mills  et  al  (2008)  in  their  study of  surgical  staff  members  from 6  institutions  who were
interviewed before the introduction of the Medical Team Training concluded that the most common
pattern found in five of the six institutions studied was that nurses and anesthesiologists have similar
perceptions that  differ  from those of  surgeons who are  more positive.  In  the  only institution  with
different  results  surgeons seemed to be more  aware of the problematic  aspects of  communication,
situational awareness and organizational support and the staff from that facility had already received
team training. 
The most commonly used tool for improving communication is briefings. Eight interventions out of 12
were bundled as Gillespie et al (2010) reported. Of the nine studies that reported team outcomes, eight
reported improvements in teamwork spirit, collaboration and communication. Briefings and debriefings
were particularly relevant for discussing factors that designed the intervention's outcome helping this
way surgeons to listen to other professional and junior professionals to speak up. Another study of 128
operating room staff  from a Canadian  hospital  who were interviewed pre and post  intervention to
37
evaluate progresses in  operating room communication due to briefings indicated that  more than one
third of briefings, 100 out of 295, were found to have been useful in the decision making process,
detecting and helping to solve problems, and in 44 of the cases the procedure plan was changed due to
aspects  revealed  during  briefing.  Communication  failures  were  reduced  from  3,95  to  1,31  per
intervention.  Concerning  staff's  perceptions  92%  agreed  that  briefings  were  useful  to  problem
resolution, 88% agreed it helped prevent mistakes, and 81% that they were worthwhile overall (Lingard
et al 2008). Altpeter et al (2007) considered briefings and more generally the practice of surgical time
out as indispensable considering it can go beyond its purpose of preventing wrong-site surgeries when
well implemented. 
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5. STUDY
5.1. Research  objective and research question
The  Operating Room Management  System proved to be  an  efficient  tool  for  risk control  without
incurring high costs. It  has also acted as a cost containment tool allowing the Morgagni-Pierantoni
Hospital to increase its efficiency level regarding use of operating room resources such as personnel
and occupancy. For these reasons the hospital has been awarded in 2011 by the European Commission
the European Public Sector Award as one of the best cases of Smart Public Service Delivery in a Cold
Economic Climate (Operating Room Management Research website). 
This attempt to increase patient safety within the organization generates, in my opinion, mechanisms
worthy to be studied. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the personnel's perception of the
dimensions of work that have been altered and the effect they have had on job satisfaction.
Thus, the research question is as follows: 
What was the impact of the Surgical Patient Path on the level of job satisfaction of medical staff
in surgical units? 
 
5.2. Significance of study
The  current  study  will  be  beneficial  for  the  management  of  the  Morgagni-Pierantoni  Hospital  by
providing results on clinicians' perceptions of the Operating Room Management System. The study's
results could represent the basis for implementing effective human resource measures. In other words,
by understanding in which way and to what  extent  the Operating Room Management  System has
altered the job satisfaction of clinicians, the hospital will be assured an advantage in developing future
staff  policies  on  the  cutting  edge  upholding  this  way  its  reputation  as  a  healthcare  institute  of
excellence.  Formulating  measures to  improve unsatisfactory conditions and preserving the strength
points of Operating Room Management System might increase job satisfaction and performance with
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benefits for the management as well as for the personnel.
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6. DATA AND METHOD
6.1. Study design
In order to assess the link between medical errors and job satisfaction, Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital
was considered to be an adequate case study due to the existence of the Operating Room Management
System and its remarkable results in terms of patient safety and operating room efficiency (Agnoletti et
al 2013, Padovani et al 2013). As a matter of fact, Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital was already enjoying
an excellent  reputation  at  national  level  for  using  innovative  measures  that  had  been successfully
implemented for drug administration, patient identification, and housekeeping work. 
In the original design the study was planned to be quantitative. Data were to be obtained through a
survey of the operating room personnel by using a standardized questionnaire. The survey was planned
to reach out to all clinicians involved in the Operating Room Management System so as to have a
response rate that could allow a quantitative study. The aim of the study was to assess participants'
judged  relationships  between  the  Operating  Room  Management  System,  patient  safety  and  job
satisfaction. For bureaucracy difficulties the sample had to be reduced and in the new case scenario it
was decided together with the hospital's management and the supervisor that a qualitative study was the
only feasible solution considering the limited time-budget. The sample was narrowed to 12 clinicians:
four surgeons, four anesthetists, and four nurses. 
I used the standardized questionnaire, originally built for the quantitative study, as basis for collecting
data for the qualitative study through semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire items fall into the
following categories: patient care, work burden, professional relationships, and general satisfaction (see
Appendix I). Previous research (Bovier and Perneger 2003, Ramirez et al 1996) has indicated that these
types of items are pertinent to understanding the dynamics of job satisfaction, and thereby the impact
the Operating Room Management System has had on clinician's job satisfaction. 
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6.2. Sample design
I conducted the interviews in mid-March during two visits to the operating room. Respondents were
chosen randomly on a voluntary basis among clinicians at work. The director of the operating room
explained them verbally what the thesis project consisted of and they were subsequently asked if they
were interested in participating. The interviewees were conducted in the various offices of the operating
room. All  of  them  were  conducted  in  Italian  except  one  that  was  conducted  in  English.  Audio
recordings of all interviews were taken and transcribed to facilitate thematic analysis. Quotes were
translated from Italian to English while data analysis was done without translating the transcriptions as
I speak both languages. All participants gave written informed consent, and ethical approval for the
research project was obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
The operating room employs 85 surgeons, 22 anesthetists, 20 anesthetist nurses, and 46 operating room
nurses. The  sampling strategy aimed at  achieving a purposeful sample in order to capture different
perspectives of the impact on job satisfaction that the patient safety measure has had. For this purpose,
perceptions of the three main types of professionals involved - surgeons, anesthetists, and nurse - were
analyzed.  In  order  to  avoid  interviewer  bias,  social  bias, privilege  of  any  one  type  of  analytical
perspective or any one type of information, four interviewees from each of the three professions under
study were considered a sufficient data source for the study's purpose given the limited time budget.
Operating room nurses were not part of the study because it was unclear to the author until entering the
operating room that Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital's efforts of reducing errors comprise more than the
Surgical Patient Path, that is two checklists filled in by the operating room nurse in addition to the
Surgical Patient Path whose data collection is responsibility of the anesthetist nurse once the patient is
brought to the operating room. 
I analyzed data analysis when all interviews had been conducted.  During interviews I reflected by
paying particular attention to differences and similarities between participants' responses as well as
ideas and issues discussed in order to build potential questions for future interviews.
Using the procedures consistent with content analysis (Bazeley 2013), data analysis started with the
familiarization  process  by  listening  the  audio  recordings  several  times  and  reading repeatedly  the
transcripts of the interviews. During the familiarization process interviews and subgroup summaries of
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different depth were made.Afterwards, each transcript was coded and code memos as well as code lists
were used. 
The research process was both inductive and deductive. The deductive component refers to the fact that
key points to be discussed with participants were drawn from the literature, but for the goal of giving
accurate representations of the reality of the situation an inductive approach was adopted allowing
modifications of the relationships between concepts throughout the analysis process.
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7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
7.1. Anesthetist nurses
The sample of anesthetist nurses consisted of four individuals, three males and one female, from the
Department of Anesthesiology. Their age ranged from 38 to 58 years-old and their working experience
at  Morgagni-Pierantoni  Hospital  varied from 7 to 40 years. The anesthetist  nurse with the shortest
working  experience  joined  the  operating  room  team  when  the  Surgical  Patient  Path  was  in  its
experimental  phase.  The  fact  that  the  sample  included  this  wide  range  of  working  experiences
represented an opportunity for capturing a variety of perceptions on the effects of the Surgical Patient
Path. The anesthetist nurse with the shortest working experience reported his personal point of view
without having had the possibility of seeing other significant changes that have happened previously in
the operating room and their effects, whereas the other three were more familiar with the dynamics of
the operating room throughout the years given their extensive experiences (average 24 years).
The interviews lasted on average 19 minutes as it was agreed with the operating room's management
that interviews would last approximately 15-25 minutes. This agreement referred to interviews with
subjects from all three professional profiles. The maximum duration was 25 minutes and the minimum
was 12 minutes. Generally, anesthetist nurses were eager to let themselves be heard. Nonetheless, they
appeared to be preoccupied by the consequences of their responses:
'I'm not sure I can say this [Operating Room Management System data is not used to plan operating
lists]. Oh yeah, I can. I even said it to the person who is in charge.'
Anesthetist nurses reported modest impacts on their job satisfaction. The Surgical Patient Path had a
temporary positive effect on the job satisfaction of one participant, a lasting positive effect for another
participant, and the remaining two reported no effect on job satisfaction.
Causes of lasting positive impact were: increased patient safety and job security due to the fact that
anesthetist nurses are not easy to find in the Italian healthcare system. Thus, by acquiring this extra
skill necessary to the hospital they became harder to substitute:
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'I believe another important thing is the fact that in many places there are no anesthetist nurses,
operating room nurse also work as anesthetist nurses. We have this distinction and if one day they
decide to cut down personnel it is unlikely that an anesthetist nurse will go away. I see it [Surgical
Patient Path] as an extra skill that helps us maintain our jobs. Among all things we do this is
fundamental.'
Lu et al (2012) suggested that job security is one of the key elements for nurses' job satisfaction.This
finding has resonance in this setting,  particularly given that the Italian healthcare system has been
facing financial constraints in recents years due to the recession. Following from this, anesthetist nurses
might have felt their positions jeopardized by the cost containment measures of the hospital.
The temporary positive impact was due to a sense of empowerment that was initially perceived by one
nurse who felt that by being in charge of the data collection process anesthetist nurses became more
important professionals in the operating room's daily routine. This positive perception was diminished
in the post implementation period because of insufficient feedback concerning efforts to comply with
the  hospital's  policies  for  patient  safety.  The  anesthetist  nurse  would  have  liked  to  have  more
information  on the  findings  of  collected  data,  and on the  use that  was made  of  these  results.  He
indicated the coordinator of his ward as the professional he would like to provide more feedback on
results of the data. 
Insufficient feedback is an issue that was presented as a key factor impeding higher job satisfaction
levels.  The need of supportive feedback as a particularly relevant factor for job satisfaction of nurses
was also reported by Krogstad et  al  (2006).  Supportive feedback could build a solid basis  for job
satisfaction to be obtained as a consequences of the fact that it fulfills the need of recognition. This was
presented in Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction (Saifuddin et al 2012) as a hygiene
factor meaning that even tough it may not lead directly to an increase in the level of job satisfaction,
job  satisfaction  without  this  element  cannot  be  expected.  Additionally,  the  Goal-Setting  Theory
developed by Locke in 1968 (Saifuddin et al 2012) suggested that motivation is intrinsically related to
meaningful goals accompanied by feedback. In general, anesthetist nurses seemed to be aware of the
importance of the Surgical Patient Path but they were lacking feedback. One nurse added that he felt
anesthetist nurses should have been involved more in the development of the data collection process.
This would have allowed an increased motivation in performing tasks.
The only nurse that did not raise the issue of insufficient feedback reported several ideas that were in
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contrast with that of other anesthetist nurses. Unlike the other nurses, his views of the Surgical Patient
Path  were  more  favorable  and  his  answers  were  more  elaborated.  The  underlying  cause  of  these
differences might be the fact he was more informed than his co-workers due to his position, nurse
coordinator, and to his participation in the development of the Surgical Patient Path. He argued that
there was an evolution of how anesthetist nurses perceived the measure, that they initially saw it as
extra workload but that they were generally satisfied with it, and technical problems of the device used
to introduce data in the system represented the only negative factor: 
 'I feel they [ anesthetist nurses] initially saw it as extra work but now it would be difficult to find
someone who is not satisfied with it. The only problem is that the devices are of very low quality, the
battery dies quickly and internet connection is a problem, too. When we have these problems, people
start complaining.'
Perceptions differed with regard to the emphasis given to the technical issues. The anesthetist nurse
coordinator pointed out technical issues as the main cause why his colleagues might not be satisfied,
while the latter pointed out the lack of feedback.This discrepancy might indicate communication gaps
among members of this professional category.
All  anesthetist  nurses  reported positive effects  on their  relation with  patients,  sense of  being well
managed and resourced, as well as patient risk, yet reported causes leading to these positive effects
were heterogenous.
Relation with patients was improved because communication events became more frequent and richer.
Anesthetist  nurses became more sociable to patients and this was beneficial in helping the latter to
tackle surgery stress:
'It [relation with patients] improved because we communicate more. The things that are written down
must be asked and then having a talk comes naturally.[...] Socializing is very appreciated by patients
because it helps them reduce a bit surgery stress.' 
It was also reported that patient safety measures became more systematic. The Surgical Patient Path
acted like a reminder, thus the likelihood of skipping steps of the process was lower than before. Before
having to use the standardized set of questions required by the Surgical Patient Path, due to the human
component, measures taken to increase patient safety varied from case to case. This variation did not
exist any longer and a higher quality standard was applied to all surgical cases: 
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'It [relation with patients] definitely improved in the sense that now the Path requires that specific
questions are asked. Before some questions may have been omitted, whereas now it's all very
systematic and the process is much more standardized.'  
Sense  of  being  well  managed  and  resourced  improved  in  all  cases  and  three  anesthetist  nurses
reconducted it to an increase in safety. One of them argued it was also due to the fact it became clearer
who does what since the Operating Room Management System contains data on the operating room's
activity. The fact that work was being tracked was seen as a positive aspect. One nurses said:
'In some special circumstances having the data has turned out to be useful for me. I definitely feel
better managed and resourced.' 
On  the  other  hand,  negative  aspects  were  revealed,  too.  One  anesthetist  nurse  argued  that  drug
administration  represented  a  drawback  of  the  software  because  it  often  happened  that  it  was  not
updated and for this reason he had to engage in the time consuming process of searching the surgeon,
ask him to update the treatment in the software, log out from the device used for data collection and
drug administration so he could log in afterwards and see the update the surgeon had just made in order
to be able to continue his work. This inconvenience made him lose the patient out of sight.
Another anesthetist nurses argued that the sense of being better managed and resourced was affected by
the fact that the Surgical Patient Path was not used at its full potential to achieve the efficiency goals set
by the management. More specifically, data from the Operating Room Management System was not
being  used  to  plan  operating  lists,  which  would  significantly  improve the  patient  flow within  the
operating room. 
Finally,  the only aspect  that  was perceived negatively by anesthetist  nurses was having adopted a
bundled intervention for patient safety, that is the Surgical Patient Path and two checklists6.  It was
unclear to them the need of such an extensive effort that they considered to be repetitive work:
'I feel to be having extra work not that useful, if I may use this term, because there are also checklists
that repeat the work.' 
In their considerations concerning the level of risk within the operating room, one of the anesthetist
nurses, who had the most extensive working experience at MPH (>40 years) argued that the operating
room had been a safe system even before the Surgical Patient Path. Even so, he noticed progresses in
6 For details see 2.3. Development of the Surgical Patient Path at Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital in Forli 
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the  post  implementation  period.  All  participants  believed  risk  of  medical  errors  was  now  lower
although  one  argued  that  the  extent  of  the  reduction  was  unclear.  Two  anesthetist  nurses  had
contradictory perceptions concerning the bundled intervention for patient safety. One argued measures
should be integrated because they were responsible for a waste of energy, personnel, and time since
they had to stop every time a problem was encountered:
'As anesthetist nurse I am in charge of  the Surgical Patient Path. Then, there is the operating room
nurse in charge of the intraoperative checklist. There is also another form (i.e. checklist) being used
that was not yet implemented across all wards. It's the form concerning the surgery site and it is again
the operating room nurse who's in charge of it. I believe they create confusion and repetition of work.
They should be integrated. I ask the patient questions on his identity and 10 minutes after my colleague
asks the same things. These measures are independent from each other and there is a waste of energy.
Two clinicians doing the same action to me is a waste of energy and personnel. They create confusion
because if one encounters a problem, we all stop. There is a problem on the checklist, we stop, a
problem with the Surgical Patient Path, we stop again.'   
However, another anesthetist nurse regarded these multiple checks as a strength:
'The system is now safer because when there is something wrong, for instance with drug
administration, the device shows you. This way double checks with other data are easier and there are
less chances of making mistakes.'  
The differences in perceptions of nurses on the bundled intervention might be linked with the cultural
resistance of operating rooms. This might stem from insufficient knowledge. However, considering the
efforts that have been taken-workshops, presentations, dashboards on the operating room's walls- in
order to ensure access to information, it  is unlikely that this was the cause unless nurses were not
targeted sufficiently. The lack of alignment of perceptions despite measures to spread knowledge is a
finding that supports results reported by Makary et al (2007), who showed that information alone does
not suffice for professionals to change attitude towards an element of novelty as they need to perceive
it as being relevant for their work.
To all anesthetist nurses the Surgical Patient Path represented a stressor although for different causes.
Technical problems and insufficient feedback seemed to be the strongest causes of stress. Other causes
were:  (1)  need  to  acquire  new  knowledge  and  change  routine,  (2)  workload  increase  during  the
development process for one anesthetist nurses that was taking part in this process, and (3) lack of
recent updates to render the software more user friendly.   
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Technical issues represented a  key stressor for nurses because in addition to the normal workload not
only were their tasks increased but also the unning of their daily routine was rendered more challenging
by software and hardware factors. More specifically, anesthetist nurses complained about the fact that
internet connection was seldom problematic, batteries were very easily discharged, and, as mentioned
above, drug administration was hard to keep updated. The magnitude of these problems' effects on
nurses' morale is not surprising in light of the findings presented by Helmreich and Davies (1996). The
two researchers reported that the use of the SHEL model and its four components software, hardware,
environment, and liveware, normally used to explain  staff 's behavior in relation to opportunities of
committing errors, has revealed that often users had a much worse perception of hardware and software
than producers.
The anesthetist nurses reported that work stress had not been influenced solely by the Surgical Patient
Path through Operating Room Management System data collection. The 2004 unification between the
municipality's two hospitals had been perceived as a significant stressor for anesthetist nurses that were
already employees of the hospital in that period. The increase in stress occurred because patient care
became  more  complex  and  workload  increased  in  terms  of  number  of  interventions.  Increase  of
workload was reported also by another nurse who despite working at the hospital did not reconduct the
increase with the 2004 unification nor with an increase of interventions performed. She felt it was due
to the fact tasks for anesthetist nurses have increased throughout the years.
Another aspect that one participant reported as a significant stressor for was communication in the
operating room in the sense that the anesthetist nurses did not feel free to express his point of view
despite his extensive work experience at the hospital (>17 years) because he felt that 'anesthetist nurses
must mind their own business'. The nurse felt that in the operating room's hierarchy there was little
space  given to  anesthetist  nurses  to  express  their  point  of  view and concerns  in  interprofessional
interactions. Throughout the years this perception became a source of dissatisfaction. The distinction
among professional profiles discouraging nurses from expressing their concerns regarding patient care
and work organization was also suggested by Makary et al (2006). Data showing a strong connection
between being able to express one's point of view freely and job satisfaction is in line with results
reported by Bhatnager and Srivastava (2012). The nurse's perception of an operating room  hierarchy of
interprofessional relations where nurses held less privileged positions in terms of freedoms and power
than other medical professionals was a concept emphasized in other studies, too (Reeves and Lewin
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2004).  
A striking discrepancy of perception was also found in relation to overtime. Only one anesthetist nurse
confirmed that, based on data he had access to given his position as nurse coordinator, overtime was
reduced thanks to improvements made possible by Surgical Patient Path. The other three participants
did not perceive any effect, neither positive nor negative. The only dimension that was influenced was
workload due to supplementary tasks consisting in data collection. One plausible explanation might be
given by the fact that individual decreases were too low to be perceived.
All four nurses reported to have a profound sense of responsibility for the quality of healthcare they
delivered both at an individual level and at group level, the latter showing a sense of group belonging.
Three anesthetist nurses reported that they felt that quality of care was improved. They argued that the
process of care had become more comprehensive, patient safety had increased, coordination between
wards was easier now, and data collected were a valuable resource for retrospective analysis. In the
view of one anesthetist nurse quality was not affected. It was merely how and when questions were
asked that changed since the Surgical Patient Path was implemented. He argued this influenced safety
not quality, and that these are two independent dimensions of healthcare.
In determining patient safety and quality of care professional relations play a crucial role especially
when considering communication events between clinicians. Two anesthetist nurses claimed that they
would tell coworkers if they saw them on the verge of making an error. One of them believed he would
feel more confident in doing so for an anesthetist given their closer professional relation, and to let
know a surgeon, the operating room nurse would be more appropriate since they work in closer contact
and have more similar knowledge. The other anesthetist nurse, on the other side, stressed that it was
fundamental to let  anyone know and that this was the operating room's work philosophy:
'We work in teams and if we see something about to go wrong we say it straight away. Especially in an
operating room this is fundamental.' 
This openness towards expressing concerns was not commonly reported since, as aforementioned, one
nurse felt that there was little space given for nurses to state their point of view. In fact, data suggested
there is a variety of perceptions regarding communication in the operating room and anesthetist nurses
felt differently about expressing themselves. One of the causes accountable for these differences could
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be the working experience in the operating room. The anesthetist nurses who argued that he would let
any  other  professional  know  about  something  that  might  represent  an  issue  of  patient  care,  was
considerably younger than the other participants and he started working in the operating room when the
Surgical Patient Path was starting to be implemented. For the purpose of increasing patient safety,
attitudes to risks were changing at that time and he did not have the possibility to internalize the aspect
of  unequal  interprofessional  relations  that  seemed so  entrenched  for  the  others  with  an  extensive
working experience in the operating room.
7.2. Surgeons
The sample of surgeons consisted of four individuals, two males and two females, from three different
departments: Head and Neck Surgery, Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery, and Orthopaedic Surgery.
Their  age  ranged  from  37  to  54  years-old  and  their  working  experience  at  Morgagni-Pierantoni
Hospital varied from 7 to 26 years. Due to the variety of working experiences it was possible to include
perspectives of both surgeons with very little experience as well as surgeons with extensive experience
during the pre-implementation period of the Surgical Patient Path. For this reason, it was possible to
capture different perceptions on the effects the Surgical Patient Path had in the operating room. 
The average length of interviews was 15 minutes. The maximum duration was 23 minutes and the
minimum  was  eighth  minutes.  Surgeons  appeared  to  be  particularly  busy  compared  to  the  other
interviewees and responses were given in a concise manner. In one case  the information flow between
interviewee and interviewer was rather scarce.
All  four  surgeons  said  that  the  Surgical  Patient  Path  had  positive  effects  on  their  level  of  job
satisfaction. A female surgeon said it strengthened the already high level of job satisfaction she has had
throughout her career, while in the remaining three cases it was beneficial in reaching a higher level
mainly because the surgeons felt that they found themselves interacting with patients in a safer system.
Also, one surgeon stressed that her job satisfaction was intrinsically related to the management's efforts
to improve work in the operating room that she greatly appreciated. Findings concerning surgeon's
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appreciation of the decrease of patient care risks are in line with results presented by Waterman et al
(2007) that  showed that the risk of committing medical errors represented a significant burden for
physicians.
Negative aspects outlined were: (1) the Surgical Patient Path slowed down the fast paced rhythm of
work in the operating room, and (2) clinicians tended to adopt a defensive attitude when errors were
detected by assigning blame rather than focusing on causes. Establishing a blame free patient safety
culture is an important step in allowing the Surgical Patient Path to deliver its results, yet this objective
had not  been fully  achieved to  date.  Analysis  of   medical  errors  episodes focused excessively on
assigning personal responsibility are not favorable to the development of a blame free environment
where errors are reported and data utilized constructively to improve the system. Findings of other
studies have showed that the lack of organization cultures that accept and use constructively errors
induce a style of practicing medicine that can be detrimental both to the patient and to the organization
through limited access to specific procedures and poorer patient  care (Waterman et al  2007, Firth-
Cozens 2001).
When discussing time dedicated to Surgical Patient Path-related tasks surgeons seemed to be having
different opinions. While two surgeons considered these tasks to be time consuming for an operating
room's time budget, another surgeon argued that 'we're only talking about a couple of minutes before
intervention'. 
The Surgical Patient Path induced positive effects according to all four surgeons on (1) quality of care,
(2) sense of being well managed and resourced, and (3) risk reduction of medical errors.
Quality of care was improved through better communication between clinicians and patients. In light of
this,  positive  effects  were  generated  both  for  patients  and  surgeons.  The  latter  were  given  more
possibilities to discuss last minute details of the intervention with patients,  thereby improving their
sense  of  delivering healthcare  services  that  satisfy  patients'  needs  to  a  larger  extent.  Additionally,
surgeons pointed out to have noticed that patients have a better understanding of all the efforts that
were being put in place in  order to maximize their safety and this was reassuring and helpful for
patients in tackling surgery stress. Patients did not seem to surgeons to be disturbed by the fact of
having to answer all the questions they were being asked:
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'When they come in the operating room with the anesthetist nurse you can see they are very happy to
answer all that huge amount of questions they are being asked. So, I believe they perceive it as a
positive thing, as an extra effort made for them. They are going through a delicate moment and they
need to feel involved in what is being done to them. I really believe patients have a very good
impression.' 
Surgeons all agreed they were better managed and resourced. One surgeon argued that making mistakes
is  natural  although  not  desirable,  that  everyone  makes  them,  and  therefore  it  is  crucial  to  adopt
preventive measures aiming at restricting error possibilities. The system was perceived by all as being
safer, and this was mainly due to the fact that data were checked repeatedly according to two surgeons.
For another surgeon the strength lied in the data that were being used:
'Risk is reduced and, at the same time, it is all based on solid data. We don't rely on empty words, we
register everything.'
Risk reduction was a positive effect unanimously perceived among surgeons. Two of the respondents
argued that operating room activity was already based on a patient safety philosophy meaning that the
Surgical  Patient  Path  represented  the  next  step  of  an  evolution  process.  One  of  the  surgeons,
acknowledging progresses achieved in terms of risk of medical errors raised the issue of the unclear
extent  of the progresses.  This might  represent  a  good indicator of the  fact  surgeons,  too,  must  be
provided with additional feedback on the Surgical Patient Path's results.   
All surgeons agreed that the Surgical Patient Path did not have any impact on overtime. They reported
that their overtime hours had neither decreased nor increased. This might be a consequence of the fact
individual variations were not significant enough to be perceived clearly. As a matter of fact, both
anesthetists and anesthetist nurses emphasized the need to further improve the use of Operating Room
Management System data to better plan operating room activity. It is mainly through this channel that
work is better organized.  
Although the process of patient care was altered through increased quality of care and risk reduction,
surgeons did not report significant changes in their relations with patients. An inconsistency regarding
this aspect was found as one surgeon stressed a positive impact on communication in the operating
room with subsequent positive effects on patient's morale:
'The relation is now better because communication with patients in the operating room is improved.
And I also feel they are less stressed now. They have more direct contact with the surgeon, who can
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help them with surgery stress, explain them the procedure. The relation is improved, they feel less
abandoned and they feel safer.' 
The surgeon in question linked progresses in terms of communication not only to better relations with
patients but also to better professional relations. However, data showed his views were not shared by
his coworkers as they consistently outlined that relations with patients and coworkers have not been
altered. Regarding their relations with patients surgeons considered that the Surgical Patient Path did
not modify the way they interacted because they had always performed empirical checks before starting
procedures. The fact that the checks became more systematic decreased the risk of errors, but it did not
alter the way surgeon approached patients. 
Surgeons' perception of communication in the post introduction period of the Surgical Patient Path was
better than those reported by nurses. This finding is consistent with those reported by various studies
conducted by  Carney et al (2010), Flin et al (2006), Mills et al (2008). Anesthetist  nurses reported
negative impacts, whereas among surgeons they were not perceived. This might objectively stem from
the fact that anesthetist nurses were in charge of the data collection process, which was considered time
consuming especially when technical issues occurred and efficient task management was impeded. In
consequence,  communication events of  nurses  deteriorated.  On the other side,  positive impacts on
communication were emphasized by surgeons. Makary et al (2006) argued that nurses and surgeons
have different communication styles imposed by their profession, that is surgeons are more pragmatic
and focused on task  completion  while  engaged in  information  flows,  whereas  nurse  have  a  more
holistic style of communicating.
Stress had been affected by the Surgical Patient Path in different manners. Negative effects due to
higher workloads induced an increase in surgeon's stress. On the other side, positive effects have also
been generated leading to lower levels of stress. This result  was attributed to the higher quality of
information  flows among operating  room professionals  that  minimized  risks  and hence  stress  was
reduced. It was also reported that efforts that were put in place in order for the Surgical Patient Path to
work were less than the benefits it  delivered. Lack of effects on the level of stress have also been
pointed out by two surgeons. 
The increase of job stress throughout the years represented a key element reported by participants. In
one particular case the increase was associated with the transition from residency to being an attending
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surgeon and the subsequent  increase in responsibility  and complex interventions performed. In the
other two cases stress was reconducted to management policies. In other words, new tasks assigned by
managers and higher objectives in terms of performance made work conditions to be considered as
stressors: 
'Stress has definitely increased and it keeps on increasing as years go by because we are constantly
asked to do more things during working hours. And it's not like we were wasting time before, I mean
our time was already full  […] Because of bureaucracy and informatization there are new tasks every
year: one more form, two more pages, three more pages, and you have to do them all following the
time frame.'  
Bovier  and Perneger (2003) suggested that in  recent years there have been several  changes in the
healthcare sector that affected physicians directly. Among changes with negative effects on stress and
job satisfaction higher administrative burdens played a significant role.    
Surgeons consistently stressed a sense of responsibility for the quality of the healthcare services they
delivered individually and as surgical teams. One surgeon emphasized that he felt to be having the
highest level of responsibility on his shoulders since he was the one patients relied on, the one they
came back to when expectations and results were in contrast, and the one who was legally responsible
for the intervention. The same surgeon perceived that group dynamics have evolved in light of the
effects induced by the Surgical Patient Path. Communication among operating room clinicians was
more efficacious, and it stimulated information flows among the various professional figures working
in the operating room. In addition,  it  inspired professionals to feel more intimately responsible for
delivering safe healthcare:
'..we could say this control mechanism improved professional relations because we [surgeons]
communicate more among each other, with nurses, with anesthetists, and anesthetist nurses. We all feel
involved in trying to make things work better. ' 
Previous  results  of  Reeves  and Lewin (2004) outlined  the surgeons'  tendency towards  considering
collaboration as activities that occur among medical specialists rather than among clinicians of various
professional profiles. For this reason, the strengthening of interprofessional collaboration represented a
significant positive effect generated by the implementation of the Surgical patient Path.  
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7.3. Anesthetists
The sample consisted of four anesthetists from the Department of Anesthesiology. Their age ranged
from 36 to 57 years-old, and their working experiences at Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital varied from
five years to 20 years. The anesthetists with the shortest working experience, five years, joined the
Department of Anesthesiology when the Surgical Patient Path was already implemented. He used his
previous working experience in a different hospital where such a patient safety measure did not exist as
a basis for reporting differences in his work.   
The average interview length among the anesthetists was 19 minutes. The maximum duration was 33
minutes and the minimum was six minutes. Anesthetists with a deeper  knowledge on the Surgical
Patient Path gave more elaborated answers compared to those of other anesthetists. In addition, the
former's perceptions tended to be more favorable than those of the rest of the interviewees including
surgeons and anesthetist nurses, too. The underlying reason was the fact that two participants who had
more information on the Surgical Patient Path than the rest due to their managerial position or to their
involvement in program's design.
The Surgical Patient Path contributed to a higher job satisfaction in two cases. In spite of that, it was
stressed that the impact on job satisfaction was limited by implementation problems: 
'...I am still in a waiting mode. I believe a lot in this project. I am very satisfied with what we
accomplished so far and that we are now able to detect errors before committing them. If we made
other progresses that would be better but more time is needed for that.'
The  remaining  two  anesthetists  claimed  that  their  satisfaction  level  did  not  suffer  any  variations
because  job  satisfaction  can  only  derive  from offering  high  quality  healthcare  and  the  healthcare
process  per se starts after performing the checks required by the Surgical Patient Path:
'It has very little to do with satisfaction. I feel more protected, but satisfaction is something you have
for a job well done. And the work has yet to begin when we finish the controls.'
The anesthetists consistently stressed that positive effects had been induced on the following elements
of the healthcare process: (1) quality of care, (2) risks of medical errors, and (3) sense of being well
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managed and resourced.
Quality of care was improved due to five main driving factors. The factors were: (1) patient flow inside
the operating room was better monitored, (2) personnel's attitude to patient safety was more systematic,
(3) controls were being done together with the patient in an explicit and exhaustive manner, (4) error
prevention was more effective,  and finally  (5)  collected data allowed retrospective evaluations for
managerial and medical purposes.
Concerning risks of medical errors all anesthetists perceived a reduction although they reported that the
extent of the reduction was unclear. Also, they stressed the importance of disclosure of data results
concerning risks in order to give feedback and keep clinicians' motivated in taking part in the Surgical
Patient Path:
'...how many cases for wrong site are tracked before the operation? I don't know. [...] I mean, the
system in the real world, not in the experimental setting, has limits. One of the limits is given by the
fact that you need to know the output of this data if you want to implement it in a hospital. This is very
important also for the team because in this way the team is motivated to perform its duties every day' 
The sense of being well  managed and resourced was generally improved. Anesthetists deemed this
positive effect to be attributable to the following factors: (1) the system was safer, (2) personnel was
better managed and more protected, (3) there was more flexibility in the use of operating rooms, and
finally (4) the operating room culture was less resistant to changes and this was also shown by the
increased use of health technology assessment. One anesthetist claimed that from his perspective the
Surgical Patient Path had high potential to induce a positive impact on the sense of being well managed
and resourced but due to its partial implementation he did not perceive significant changes:
'...we know that when this measure will be working at 100% it will help us feel more protected and it
will also allow us to organize our work better. Now it is not being used at its maximum.'
This inconsistency might stem from the fact the anesthetist in question had more knowledge regarding
the  Surgical  Patient  Path  and  its  potential  due  to  his  managerial  position.  In  light  of  this,  his
expectations might have been set higher than those of his coworkers and thereby they became harder to
meet. 
Positive impacts on relation with patients were generally reported although one participant pointed out
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he had always paid particular attention at patient safety from his own initiative, thereby the introduction
of the Surgical Patient Path did not change significantly the way he interacted with patients. He had
always  asked  his  patients  the  informations  he  needed  in  order  to  complete  his  work  and  the
standardization of this step did not influence the way he relates to patients: 
' Now there is a checklist but I used to ask the things concerning my work before as I ask them now,
and generally speaking the relationship with patients is as before.' 
The  other  anesthetists,  however,  stated  that  their  relation  with  patients  was  improved  due  to  an
increased contact between the two that helped anesthetists to know better their patients. In absence of
the Surgical Patient Path, anesthetists had contact with their patients only a couple of weeks before the
intervention during visits. Now, in the preoperative phase they were incentivized to interact more and
this was beneficial for building a patient-physician relationship:
'... before the implementation the patient was a kind of ghost in the operating room because sometimes
you can see patients only the morning of the operation not before because a part of this system is to
visit every patient one week or two weeks before the operation. Now there is an extensive preoperative
evaluation and I think this is very important to establish a relationship with your patient. I believe this
is one of the values of this system.' 
In addition to this, data showed anesthetists considered the patient flow in the operating room to be
better  organized  and  less  stressful  although  workload  increased  and  tasks  became  more  rigid.
Participants did not report  significant changes on their working hours. One anesthetist believed his
overtime might have been reduced in recent years but he did not have a clear understanding of the
extent of the reduction. Another anesthetist claimed that from his perspective the Surgical Patient Path
could be used to reduce overtime but for this purpose the way the program was used to date should
change:
'I know that when we'll start using it properly, overtime will be reduced because we'll be able to
organize our work better. Now we're still in the implementation phase though.'
Perceptions  concerning  overtime  outlined  the  discrepancies  among  those  that  had  access  to  more
information  on  the  Surgical  Patient  Path  because  of  their  role  in  the  operating  room or  to  their
participation  in  its  development  and  those  that  did  not.  The  latter  consistently  reported  constant
overtime  both  in  the  pre  and  post  implementation  periods,  while  the  former  outlined  potential
beneficial effects.  
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The Surgical Patient Path represented a stressor in the initial phase of its implementation as it was
regarded as an element of novelty in the operating room's culture. The introduction of new tasks led to
confusion in the daily routine and efforts had to be put in place in order to help clinicians get a full
understanding of the new patient safety measure and reduce related stress:
'...the level of stress of the operators is lower because before when we implemented the project
everybody was concerned about what they had to do. Now everything is standardized, it's all in the
computer. We have had a lot of courses and workshops on the project for everybody in the team and
now the difficulties are not the same as in the past. The level of stress was reduced from this point of
view. 
Another anesthetist deemed the reduction of the level of stress in the post implementation period to
several progresses that had been achieved: (1) patient safety was improved, (2) patient flow in the
operating room was improved as well,  (3) surgeons were given more information on the healthcare
process of their patients, and finally (4) the problem-solving process of patient issues became more
systematic. It became clearer for operating room personnel whose responsibility it was to address the
issues raised during the patient's path from the ward to the operating room, and this facilitated the
healthcare process and the patient safety efforts. In the pre implementation period problems detected by
the operator in charge of the patient's transport to the operating room were addressed individually as
there was no systematic approach in place for this type of problems: 
'Stress was reduced because the Surgical Patient Path is a safety guarantee and it also improves
patient flow. Even for surgeons, they need to have clear information on their patients' path and the
Operating Room Management System offers them that. If a patient does not follow the predefined path
that's an issue. [...]The program was built in such a manner that there is one person [physician] who is
in charge of solving problems when they are detected. Patient problems are not any more solved
individually by the operator [who brings the patient to the operating room].' 
The other two anesthetists did not perceive any impact on their stress level that could be attributed to
the  Surgical  Patient  Path.  One  anesthetist  stressed  that  his  risk  awareness  was  raised  after  the
implementation as he had been unaware of the risks they were taking in the previous period. 
Overall  job stress increased throughout  the years mainly due to pressure from the management to
increase  efficiency in  light  of  the financial  challenges  the  Morgagni-Pierantoni  Hospital  and more
generally the Italian healthcare system has been facing in recent years:
'I think the level of stress is maybe higher than in the past [...]it has to do with the pressure from the
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management to do more cases in the same time. We also have economic problems in this moment and I
believe these factors contribute to the higher level of stress.' 
Results above are in line with the literatures who showed that as a consequence of the increasing
healthcare costs, managerial attempts of tackling this problem have often focused on increasing time
and efficiency pressure on physicians. This has generated negative effects on job related stress as well
as on physicians' level of job satisfaction (Bovier and Perneger 2003).  
Anesthetists  reported a sense of responsibility for the quality of healthcare  services provided. One
participant claimed that the understanding of the concept of quality has changed in the operating room
since the introduction of the Surgical Patient Path. Quality was internalized in the daily routine and it
was  no  longer  perceived  as  a  requirement  imposed  by  the  management.  Clinicians  felt  more
intrinsically responsible for delivering healthcare services of the best quality possible: 
'I think for a lot of my colleagues now the quality is intrinsic, it is in our spirit. So, quality for us now is
not a bad word. Before quality was just a word on paper, just some kind of bureaucratic duty for the
accreditation of the hospital. Now we live the quality every day. Maybe you don't call it quality, but it is
quality...'
7.4. Overall results
The findings from this study showed that the Surgical Patient Path has generally had a positive impact
on  the  level  of  job  satisfaction  of  clinicians.  Surgeons  have  all  perceived  positive  effects,  while
anesthetists and anesthetist nurses both reported to have perceived improvements although this was not
stressed by the majority.  
Overall, surgeons stressed the highest satisfaction levels, whereas anesthetist nurses the lowest. Similar
findings concerning the impact on clinicians' levels of job satisfaction resulting from the introduction
of new technologies in the operating room have been revealed by Stahl et al (2005). Anesthetist nurses
reported as the key element impeding increases in their job satisfaction levels the lack of sufficient
feedback. This made it impossible for them to have a clear understanding of the usefulness of their
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work. Padovani et al (2013) reported that several managerial attempts were made in order to provide
operating room staff with information on the aims that were sought after and the results that were
achieved. More specifically, the channels used were team meetings and dashboards attached on the
operating rooms' walls. Despite these measures, data indicated that nurses' understanding of the results
that were achieved throughout the years was not clear enough to allow them to maintain their level of
motivation. 
The Surgical Patient Path has been implemented so as to increase patient safety and efficiency. The first
goal  was  reached  according  to  clinicians  that  unanimously  reported  that  the  risks  of  patient  care
decreased. This critical aspect of healthcare, was consistently identified by clinicians as  responsible for
increasing the quality of care. Appreciation of these achievements was to be expected as all participants
stressed they felt a deep sense of responsibility for the healthcare services they delivered individually
and as a group. 
Participants outlined that the Surgical Patient Path impacted various dimensions of their professional
lives. Unlike anesthetist nurses, the other professional profiles reported modest positive effects, while
anesthetist nurses consistently mentioned relations with patients improved because their interactions
have been intensified.  Reversed effects on interprofessional interactions were reported. These opposite
trends were intrinsically  related to the fact  the data collection process was done together  with the
patient and by doing so communication events were more frequent. On the other hand, socializing
occasions among coworkers have been reduced and hindered by the fact technical issues considerably
increased the amount of time nurses have to dedicate to collecting data, which appeared to be difficult
to understand for those who were not involved. 
Data suggested that the introduction of the Surgical Patient Path represented a stressor for all nurses.
On the other side, for surgeons and anesthetists the opposite effect was outlined as stress was reduced.
The variation in perceptions could objectively be linked to the the fact anesthetist nurses represented
the subgroup whose daily routine has been varied the most in terms of workload and complexity.
Changes on work routine have been reported to be considered as stressors by anesthetist nurses. This
was shown by data suggesting that participants who have experienced the expansion of the operating
room in 2004 considered it  to be responsible for additional job related stress.  Furthermore,  nurses
reported that workload increased throughout the years regardless of these events.  The various changes
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that have been made in the operating room have forced nurses to face profound shifts in their volume
and type of  responsibilities. Results showing that nurses' stress and changes in the operating room
routine are negatively correlated were also reported by Stahl et al 2005 and Lambrou et al (2010). 
Although clinicians pointed out their workload is now higher none reported that his/her overtime has
been decreased due to the effects induced by the Surgical Patient Path. This finding is in contrast with
several results suggested by Agnoletti et al (2013) that argued that 'overtime events decreased in 2010
(23%) and in 2011 (21%) compared to 2009 (28%)'7 , and also by Padovani et al (2013) that showed
overtime working hours expenditure was reduced by 21% between 2009 and 2010. Additionally, the
anesthetist nurse coordinator in charge of planning stated that data he had access to in virtue of the fact
he was in charge planning shifts showed overtime has considerably decreased. The reason why these
variations have not been perceived might be due to the fact that they are not significant enough at
individual levels to be perceived. 
7 Agnoletti et al (2013) p. 1
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
8.1. Conclusions
The role played by job satisfaction in determining the quality of healthcare is a well known concept in
the literature. Hence, excellence in the delivery of  patient care cannot be reached by maladapted and
dissatisfied  clinicians (Al Juhani and Kishk 2006, Aiken et al 2002, Bhatnager and Srivastava 2012).
The current study highlights the effects of a patient safety measure on the level of job satisfaction
among clinicians working in the operating room - surgeons, anesthetist nurses, and anesthetists.
The  Surgical  Patient  Path  was  consistently  described  as  an  effective  patient  safety  measure  by
clinicians from all three professional profiles. In point of fact, they all stressed the fact that the risks of
committing medical errors were reduced. The extent of the reduction was, however, unclear showing
that more data disclosure on results is necessary.
Data  showed  that  the  measure's  positive  impacts  have  generally  induced  a  higher  level  of  job
satisfaction although notable distinctions between professional profiles were identified. Positive effects
were emphasized at the highest degree by surgeons who greatly appreciated the fact that the operating
room became a safer environment both for clinicians and patients. 
Anesthetist  nurses'  increase  in  job  satisfaction  was  hindered  mainly  by  two  factors.  They  were
insufficient feedback concerning results gathered during the Surgical Patient Path and technical issues
of the device used for collecting the data. Despite managerial efforts to provide feedback on results
achieved due  to  the  Surgical  Patient  Path  nurses  repeatedly reported they  did not  suffice,  thereby
motivation decreased and started to be substituted by frustration and confusion concerning the purpose
of the extra workload they were asked to put in practice.  
Lack  of  sufficient  knowledge  on  the  Surgical  Patient  Path  was  also  indicated  by  the  fact  that
anesthetists perceptions and level of job satisfaction appeared to be greatly determined by the level of
information they had access to. Clear discrepancies among anesthetists with more information and the
rest were observed in the sense that more information was linked with better perceptions. 
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Considering  that  insufficient  data  disclosure  led  to  date  to  considerable  variations  in  terms  of
perceptions, to ambiguity concerning the real impact that the Surgical Patient Path has had on risks of
patient care, and to a decrease in interest showed by anesthetist nurses, communication ought to be
addressed and clinicians must be presented the progresses that have been achieved in virtue of the
implementation of this patient safety measure. In other words, the necessary support must be put in
place if clinicians are to be expected to maximize patient safety and efficiency without perceiving the
Surgical Patient Path as a stressor leading to burnout situations. For this purpose, future developments
of the program must be designed by bearing in mind clinicians' need to understand its importance. This
is  vital  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  high  levels  of  motivation  to  perform  their  tasks  diligently,
harmonize perceptions and increase job satisfaction of anesthetist nurses. 
8.2. Limitations
The current study faced some important limitations. To begin, participants were interviewed in single
occasions about their perceptions of changes due to the Surgical Patient Path. Longitudinal assessments
could  have  given a  more  comprehensive  picture  of  the  peculiarities  that  the  operating  room staff
experienced throughout the post implementation period. Such longitudinal assessment, despite being
necessary to have a more accurate understanding of the evolution of perceptions were beyond the scope
of the study.
These accounts cannot be extrapolated from the circumstances that surrounded the participants. The
convenience sampling method used led to findings that are inherently not generalizable and repeatable.
I believe that the interviewees were representative not in a statistical sense, but in the colloquial sense
of the word, of other surgeons, anesthetists, and anesthetist nurses working in the same operating room.
A sample size of 12 subjects cannot be considered large enough to make generalizations that go beyond
the research site. 
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Appendix I
 Questionnaire Morgagni-Pierantoni Hospital
Age:.....................................................................
Working experience at MPH:..............................
Sex:......................................................................
Ward:...................................................................
Profession:...........................................................
 
Patient care
1. Did the relation with your patients change after the introduction of the patient safety measures? In 
which way? 
2. Is the quality of care you are providing now after the introduction of the patient safety measures is 
higher than before? 
Burden
3.  Is  the  level  of  stress  you  experience  now at  work  the  same  as  before  the  introduction  of  the
Operating Room Management System, e.g. 2005 compared to 2014? 
4. Did overtime work decrease after the introduction of the Operating Room Management System?
5. After the introduction of the Operating Room Management System do you feel better managed and
resourced?
6. Do you have a sense of responsibility for the work quality of the staff in your team?
7.  How  much  of  the  variation  of  your  stress  level  would  you  attribute  to  the  Operating  Room
Management System?  
8. Did the risk of future clinical errors (wrong site/patient/intervention) decrease after the introduction
of the Operating Room Management System?
 
Professional relations
9.  Did  your  professional  relation  with  other  medical  staff  improve  after  the  introduction  of  the
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Operating Room Management System?
General satisfaction
10. All things considered, did your level of satisfaction increase after the introduction of the Operating
Room Management System?
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